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SUMMARY
This report documents the work performed by Lockheed in assessing the risk to
commercial transport aircraft due to the accidental release of carbon/graphite
fibers from fire damage to commercial aircraft incorporating advanced composite j
materials. This work was performed under contract to the National Aeronautics and I
Space Administration in support of their national risk assessment program. While
only small amounts of carbon/graphite composites are in use today on commercial trans
ports, there was concern over the considerable increase in usage projected for the '.
next ten to fifteen years. In response to this concern, the risk to the Lockheed !
L-1011 Tristar is assessed for conditions projected for the year 1993. This
assessment involves identifying the electrical and electronic equipments on the
L-1011 that are susceptible to carbon fiber contamination, and computing their
probabilities of failure, the associated cost risk and the hazard to continued
operation.
The results of the assessment show the risks associated with the use of
carbon/graphite composites on commercial transport aircraft are insignificant. The
expected annual cost risk for the L-1011 domestic fleet is $25-76 for the year 1993
which is negligible compared to the expected annual costs associated with current
sources of equipment failure. Also, current aircraft operational and maintenance
practices afford adequate protection from a hazard to continued operation. System
failure due to carbon/graphite contamination is such an unlikely occurrence that it
need not be considered.
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'CHAPTER[ 1
INTRODUCTION
Composite materials containing carbon/graphite fibers are being used in a
wide variety of applications because their high-strength, light-weight structural
properties result in considerable cost benefits. These characteristics make them
especially attractive for use in aircraft structures. However, there is evidence
that the electrically conductive carbon fibers can cause failures in electrical and
electronic equipment. Because of their light weight, dissemination of airborne
fibers could result in contamination of unprotected electrical equipments.
Since projections indicate a considerable increase in the usage of carbon fiber
composite materials, the accidental release' of carbon fibers is of concern. To !
i
assess the potential risk, the government has undertaken a program involving many of ;
the Federal agencies to deal with different aspects of the problem. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has the responsibility for evaluating
the national risk associated with the accidental-release of carbon fibers (CF) from
civil aircraft and to assess the vulnerability of commercial transport aircraft. It
is part of a larger program to evaluate the national risks and hazards .
NASA Langley has established contracts with the three major commercial aircraft
manufacturers (Boeing Commercial Airplane'; Co. , Douglas Aircraft Co. and the Lockheed
California Co.) to aid in their program. The contracts require the aircraft manu-
facturers to provide data for the assessment of national risk from the accidental
release of carbon fibers (CF) in commercial aircraft, to evaluate the potential for
carbon fiber (CF) damage to aircraft equipments and to take part in an ad hoc working
group consisting of representatives of the organizations participating- in the NASA
program.
The role of the airframe manufacturers in the NASA carbon fiber (CF) risk
assessment program is illustrated in Figure 1-1. The Task 1 studies have been com-
pleted and documented. This report relates to the Task 2 studies and primarily
documents the Lockheed efforts in the program. _. ,
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In Chapter 2 of this report, the electrical and electronic equipment in the
L-1011 Tristar which are susceptible to carbon fiber (CF) icontamination damage are j
identified. Chapter 3 discusses the L-1011 transfer functions. Chapter H docu-
ments the statistical studies performed on aircraft operations and aircraft config-
urations at airports. In Chapter 55 equipment failure probabilities due to CF
exposure are derived. Chapter 6 presents the expected increase in L-1011 equipment
failures due to CF contamination for the year 1993. Chapter 7 presents the expected
increase in L-1011 maintenance costs due to CF contamination for the year 1993.
Chapter 8 discusses the hazard to continued L-1011 operation following the accidental
release of carbon fibers. The conclusions are presented in Chapter 9.
This report incorporates data furnished by NASA and other parties under contract
to NASA. Suggestions from a number of persons at the Douglas Aircraft Company and
the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company have been incorporated throughout this report.
In addition, they have furnished a large portion of the data contained in Chapter h.
We would like to acknowledge the team of Bionetics Corporation for providing essential
test data on the vulnerability and transfer functions of aircraft equipment. Also
we would like to recognize Dr. Joseph Fiksel, Dr. Donald B. Rosenfield, and
Mr. Mark Pendrock of Arthur D. Little, Inc. for furnishing the probabilities of air-
craft exposure contained in Appendix C. Finally we would like to thank
Dr. Wolf Elber, Mr. Jerry L. Humble, and Mr. Robert J. Huston of the NASA Langley
Research Center. Dr. Elber provided technical direction during the course of this
study, Mr. Humble provided the focal point for a coordinated effort from the air-
frame manufacturers, and Mr. Huston provided the overall program management.
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_ CHAPTER Li"
L-1011 ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT VULNERABILITY
This chapter describes the work performed in identifying electrical and
electronic equipment in the L-1011 Tristar which are susceptible to carbon fiber
(CF) contamination damage. The typical L-1011 Tristar selected for the investiga-.
tion was one heavily configured with avionic equipment. It was decided to review
, as many components and assemblies as possible even though some of the items are not
• normally found on many L-1011 aircraft in airline service.
2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF VULNERABLE EQUIPMENTS
I . Figure 2-1 illustrates the various phases of work in identifying vulnerable
; equipment. From over six hundred types of equipments surveyed, two hundred and
; fifty eight components and assemblies were identified for evaluation of vulnerability
to carbon fiber (CF) contamination. The remainder were considered invulnerable due
: to the requirement for sealed enclosures. Each of these 258 equipments were reviewed
for characteristics affecting their vulnerability. Some of the characteristics con-
• sidered were:
; • enclosure construction
! • cooling
• internal circuitry construction
• termination types and spacing
• circuit coating
! • connectors
! • voltage and power ranges
ij • impedances
I . • ' location in aircraft
To ensure a thorough investigation, many of the equipments were physically examined
1
 to verify their characteristics.
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OVER 600 TYPES OF j
EQUIPMENT SURVEYED j
NASA EQUIPMENT
VULNERABILITY
TESTING!
258 EQUIPMENT TYPES
IDENTIFIED FOR f
EVALUATION I
105 EQUIPMENT TYPES
IDENTIFIED AS
POTENTIALLY
VULNERABLE)
1
INVULNERABLE
EQUIPMENTS |
84 EQUIPMENT TYPES!
IDENTIFIED AS
SUSCEPTIBLE TO CF
CONTAMINATION
Figure 2-1. Equipment Vulnerability Assessment
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One hundred and five out of the original two hundred and fifty eight were
found to have some potentially vulnerable ^characteristic such as an open enclosure,
exposed circuitry, etc. These units were reevaluated with respect to vulnerability
test data when it was furnished by NASA. As a result, eighty four of the one hun-
dred and five equipments were identified as susceptible to carbon fiber (CF) con-
tamination damage.
2.2 VULNERABILITY CATEGORIES
The eighty four susceptible equipments were assigned to different vulnerability
categories based on the criteria derived from the test data. Table 2-1 presents the
seven vulnerability categories that were established and their mean exposure-to-
failure values. For the first two categories, 6 and p, it was necessary to establish
sub-categories because of the wide variation in internal circuitry. Three of the
categories, 6 , T and 4^ are listed in the table even though they were found to be in-
vulnerable to carbon fiber (CF) contamination damage. The last column in the table
lists how many of the eighty four equipment types are in each vulnerability category.
It is seen that no L-1011 equipment items were under category Y (open boxes with un-
coated boards and protected terminals).
2.3 EQUIPMENT CATEGORIZATION
A listing of the eighty four vulnerable equipments is shown in Table 2-2. The
system usage and the quantity per aircraft for each item is listed. The total
quantity per aircraft for all the equipments is two hundred and eighty one. The
equipments are located in one of three designated locations :|
• Flight Station
• Passenger Cabin
• "Avionic Centers
The avionic centers on the L-1011 Tristar consist of the forward electronic service
center and the middle electrical service center. The estimated number of exposed"
contracts for each equipment and its vulnerability category (from Table 2-1) are
also shown.
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TABLE 2-1. EQUIPMENT^VULNERABILITY CATEGORIES
VULNERABILITY
CATEGORY
6
P
\
6
€
T
4
DESCRIPTION
Open boxes with coated
boards and unprotected
terminals
Open boxes vith uncoated
boards and unprotected
terminals
Open boxes with uncoated
boards and protected
terminals
Open boxes with coated
boards and protected
terminals
Open boxes with unprotected
terminals (no 'boards)
Open boxes with protected
terminals (no boards)
Closed boxes
MEAN EXPOSURE
TO FAILURE (E)
FIBER-SECONDS PER
CUBIC METER
e±: E = 1.5 x 107
o
6 : E = 1.0 x 10
P : I = 1.5 x 10T
o
p2: E = 1.0 x 10
— QE = 1.0 x 10
Invulnerable
E - 1.0 x 108
Invulnerable
Invulnerable
NUMBER OF
L-1011
EQUIPMENT
TYPES
T
38
k
12
0
—
23
—
: -
2.k CURRENT SOURCE DATA
Having identified the vulnerable equipments, it was necessary to compile reli-
ability and maintenance cost data for analyses in.subsequent chapters. These data
will be used to assess the cost risk and to determine whether any equipments have a
significantly greater probability of failure resulting from carbon fiber (CF) expo-
sure. The compilation of reliability and maintenance cost data from current sources
is presented in Appendix A.
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TABLE 2-2. VULNERABLE EQUIPMENTS LIST
EQUIPMENT
NO.
1
.2
3
k
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
11*
15
16
17
18
SYSTEM USAGE
Air Conditioning
Air Conditioning
Air Conditioning
Auto Flight
Auto Flight
Auto Flight
Auto Flight
Auto Flight
Auto Flight
Auto Flight
Auto Flight
Radio Communications
Radio Communications
Passenger Service
Passenger Service
Passenger Service
Passenger Service
Passenger Service
QUANTITY
PER
AIRCRAFT*
1
5 .
3
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
3
2
1
1
1
3
LOCATION
IN
AIRCRAFT
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Passenger
Cabin
NUMBER
OF
EXPOSED
CONTACTS
300
128
176
50
1*0
3000
3000
3000
3000
3000
2100
100
2500
190
8
180
320
50
VULNERABILITY
CATEGORY
92
62
62
€
e
61
61
61
61
61
91
62
?2
62
e
62
62
62
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TABLE 2-2. VULNERABLE EQUIPMENTS LIST (Continued)
EQUIPMENT
NO.
19
20
21
22
23
2h
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
3U
35
36
SYSTEM USAGE
Passenger Service
Passenger Service
Passenger Service
Passenger Service
Passenger Service
Passenger Service
Passenger Service
Passenger Service
Electrical Power
Electrical Power
Electrical Power
Electrical Power
Electrical Power
Electrical Power
Electrical Power
Electrical Power .
Electrical Power
Electrical Power
QUANTITY
PER
AIRCRAFT*
U
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
h
i
1
i
1
i
i
i
LOCATION
IN
AIRCRAFT
Passenger
Cabin
Avionic
Centers
Passenger
Ca~bin
Passenger
Cabin
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
'Flight-
Station
Flight
Station'
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
NUMBER
OF
EXPOSED
CONTACTS
60
850
50
90
200
32
'
120
120
1*50
500
85
2U
U20
- 368 -
566
2Uo
170
VULNERABILITY
CATEGORY
62
62
€
€.
P2
62
02
e2
€
62
62
P2
e2
6
€ ' '
€
e
€.
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TABLE 2-2. VULNERABLE EQUIPMENTS LIST (Continued)
EQUIPMENT
NO.
37
38
39
ho
hi
h2
h3
hh
h5
h6
hi
h8
h9
50
51
52
53
5^
SYSTEM USAGE
Electrical Power
Electrical Power
Electrical Power
Fire Extinguisher
Slat Control
Windshield Heat
Windshield .Heat
Water Waste
Proximity Sensing
Aural Warning
Flight Data
Flight Data
AIDS
AIDS
TETDS -
Weight & Balance
Instrument Lights
Warning Lights
QUANTITY
PER
AIRCRAFT*
1
3
1 '
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3- ' '
1
2
1
LOCATION
IN
.AIRCRAFT
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
NUMBER
OF
EXPOSED
CONTACTS
117
226
50
' 2k
50
50
28
hO
50
20
30
50
100
50
30- -'
ho
Various
hooo
VULNERABILITY
CATEGORY
€
e
€
€
6?
0
6
€
e
p2
62
e2£_
62£.
Q
2
Q
Q
p
2
61
2-7
'TABLE 2-2. VULNERABLE EQUIPMENTS LIST (Continued)
EQUIPMENT
NO.
55
56
57
58 '
59
60
6l
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
SYSTEM USAGE
Cabin Lighting
Ca~bin Lighting
Cabin Lighting
Cabin Lighting
Cabin Lighting
Cabin Lighting
Navigation
Navigation
Navigation
Navigation
Navigation
Navigation
Navigation
Navigation
"Navigation
Navigation
Navigation
Navigation
QUANTITY
PER
AIRCRAFT*
22
U
120
1
3
10
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
LOCATION
IN
AIRCRAFT
Passenger
Cabin
Passenger
Cabin
Passenger
Cabin
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
NUMBER
OF
EXPOSED
CONTACTS
66
1*4
36
45
58
215
1*0
200 •
- 86
1500
1800
ll*0
50
50
-• -50 "
75
1750
75
VULNERABILITY
CATEGORY
P2
P2
P2
P2
P2
Pi
6
62
8-2
Pi
Pi
02
62
e2
e2
e2
P2
e2
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TABLE 2-2. VULNERABLE EQUIPMENTS LIST (Continued)
EQUIPMENT
NO.
73
T^
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
Qk
SYSTEM USAGE
Navigation
Navigation
Navigation
Navigation
Navigation
Airborne Aux Pwr
Airborne Aux Pwr
Fuel Flow
Fuel Flow
Engine Ignition
Engine Indicating
Engine Indicating
QUANTITY
PER
AIRCRAFT*
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
LOCATION
IN
AIRCRAFT
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Avionic
Centers
Passenger
Cabin
Passenger
Cabin
Flight
•Station
Flight
Station
Flight
Station
Avionic
Centers
Flight
Station
NUMBER
OF
EXPOSED
CONTACTS
125
60
1800
1*8
100
75
200
20
75
75
700
32
VULNERABILITY
CATEGORY
62
62
Pi
62
62
62
€
€
6
e
02
€
*Note - Total quantity per aircraft equals 28l.
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L-1011 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
The term TRANSFER FUNCTION (TF) is used in the context of this study to express
a carbon fiber (CF) exposure ratio. Specifically, it is the ratio of the CF concen-
tration at the locations of a piece of electrical or electronic equipment on the
L-1011 aircraft to the CF concentration in the aircraft external environment.
Carbon fiber can only infiltrate the aircraft and contaminate potentially
vulnerable electrical and electronic components through the Integrated Pneumatic
System (IPS) or through certain open external doors. Whenever the aircraft is
parked with all doors closed, the IPS not operating, and no external electrical
power supplied, CF infiltration is not possible and the TF is zero.;
3.1 CARBON FIBER DISTRIBUTION
Depending on the operating configuration of the aircraft, air containing CF can
be ingested through several sources, filtered, conditioned, distributed throughout
the aircraft and finally exhausted overboard. The various distributions paths are
shown schematically in Figure 3-1, and each is discussed in the following sections.
Sources
The L-1011 Integrated Pneumatic System (IPS) supplies the airplane air condi-
tioning and pressurization and provides cooling air to the!electronic equipment i
bays. It consists of an efficient enginejbleedjair system for inflight operations
and an auxiliary power unit (APU) for ground and backup inflight use. The two sys-
tems normally operate independently (APU and engine bleedair are not mixed) and are
each a potential source of CF. The ground carts that provide high pressure air for
engine starting and low pressure, preconditioned air for air conditioning and equip-
ment cooling are additional CF sources. The airplane could also be exposed when
avionic center or passenger doors are open. With ground electrical power supplied,
the avionics bay exhaust fans would draw air in through the open doors. These
sources are discussed in more detail below.
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FLIGHT STATION]
iNSTRUMENTf
PANEtT
t
OPEN AVIONIC
CENTER DOOR
PRECOND
CART
I
i FILTER!
J
IFANI
(AVIONICj
(CENTER ]
iCABIN AND/OR I
:FLIGHT STATION)
i
COLD AIR
WATER
SEPARATOR
BLEED AIRi
CLEANER /
,ENGINE!
t
OPEN
{PASSENGER!
DOOR
EXTERNAL CF CLOUD!
Figure 3-1. L-1011 CK Distribution: Paths
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The engine bleed air system supplies air to the pneumatic and air conditioning
systems. Air is bled from the engine 8th compressor stage (intermediate pressure)
of each of the' three Rolls Royce RB211 engines during normal flight operation. This
air is supplemented, as needed, by high pressure, 13th compressor stage air. The.8th
.stage bleed air offtakes are located near the outside (O.D.) of the annulus. The 13th
stage offtakes are located in the inside wall (l.D.) of the annulus.
The O.D. offtake design of the intermediate pressure port is most efficient for
extracting air from the engine. Unfortunately, any dust, debris or carbon fibers
that may have been ingested by the engine, will be concentrated along the outer
perimeter of the annulus. That this location is more efficient at collecting
foreign particles along with engine bleedair than the high pressure port is illus-
trated by the results of the cabin air dust ingestion tests performed on the engines
by Rolls Royce. In the tests, it was found that the efficiency of both ports for
sampling fine particles (<^ 0|jm)was similar (59$ for the IP system versus 10% for the
HP system). However, the IP system was much more efficient at sampling coarse par-
ticles (an average of 17% in two tests compared to .Q% for the HP port in one test).
The APU driven load compressor has sufficient capacity to operate the entire
air conditioning system at optimum capacity. Although the system is capable of
being operated at altitudes up to 31,000 feet, its primary function is to provide
ground self-sufficiency for the L-1011. The APU takes air from an inlet, about
30 feet above the ground, and compresses it in an engine driven turbo compressor.
Any CF collected at the inlet will be delivered to the pneumatic system.
The commercial airlines use a variety of ground carts, both high and low
pressure, for various ground operations with their airliners. High pressure carts
are normally used for engine starting. However, they also have sufficient capacity
to permit their use to run the.air conditioning system. In conversations with
several suppliers of high pressure carts, it was revealed that some cart manufac-
turers incorporate filters in their cart designs, and some do not.
Pre-conditioned air (PC) carts are used by the airlines, to provide cart con-
ditioned air to the airplane, thereby obviating the need for the use of onboard
refrigeration packs during air terminal operations. When used with the L-1011,
such carts supply low pressure air directly to the cold air plenum. Pre-conditioned
air carts usually incorporate several filters in their compressor inlet ducts.
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Whenever there is electrical power supplied to the aircraft, exhaust fans
extract air from the avionic centers which results in air being ingested through
any open door in the avionic center or the passenger cabin. When an avionic center
door is open, CF contaminated air would be ingested directly into the compartment
with sufficient velocity to allow CF to reach the equipment in the compartment with
little attenuation. However, CF contaminated air ingested through a passenger door
would be heavily attenuated by settling and entrapment in the cabin furnishings
and carpet. The extremely low airflow velocity as compared to the fibers fall rate
would produce a further attenuation of airborne fibers as they pass through the many
interconnected compartments below the passenger floor.
Internal Distribution and Filtering
Dust (and CF) bearing air supplied by the engine bleed ports, the APU or high
pressure carts, is ducted to' the air distribution manifold. From there three ducts
take it through the three bleed air cleaners where most of the particulate matter is
removed. It then travels to the three ECS air cycle machines. The distribution
manifold system incorporates three duct crossbleed isolation valves that enable
division of the manifold into isolated sections. The valves provide operational
flexibility for all three refrigeration packs. Each source (any engine, the APU or
high pressure cart) can supply air to any or all air cycle machines. Air leaving
the ECS refrigeration packs is ducted to the cold air plenum for distribution
throughout the air vehicle. When pre-conditioned air carts are in use, the low
pressure, conditioned air is ducted directly, to the cold air plenum.
In early serial aircraft, silica and other fine particulate matter in the
engine bleed air supplied to the refrigeration packs was greatly reducing compressor
life. It became necessary to develop a means of removing the particles and centrif-
ugal bleedair cleaners were incorporated. The cleaners remove more than 90$ of the
dust particles from the airstream and should be equally effective at removing CF.
The functions of the environmental control system (ECS) are to control the
• supply of conditioned air to the cabin, flight station, galleys, lavatories, and
aft cargo compartment; to provide' proper occupied area ventilation and cooling; to
provide cabin pressurization; to heat the cargo compartments; and to supply cooling
air for the forward electronics and mid-electrical service centers. • The air condi-
tioning system, using a high pressure source (APU or engine bleed air) conditions
the air for cooling or heating as required by the automatic temperature control
system and regulates the air flow rate to the cabin. This system consists of
three independent refrigeration packs which are manifolded together downstream for
greater flexibility and reliability. Each pack contains a water separator, located
downstream of the air conditioning unit, consisting of a coalescer, a vortex gener-
ator, a moisture collector, and a bypass valve. The water separator is effective
in extracting both entrained moisture and solid particles from the air. A portion
of the output from each pack bypasses the water separator to provide zone trim air
to the cabin distribution system.
Air from the three Environmental Control System packs, or pre-conditioned air
carts, passes into the cold air plenum for distribution to the occupied portion of
the fuselage (passenger cabin, flight stations, and galley). From these areas, it
is exhausted from the cabin through floor"level vents in the sidewall to many under-
floor compartments and finally discharged from the fuselage through the forward and .
mid avionic centers by the exhaust fans. In addition, cooling air is ducted directly
from the cold air plenum to the flight station instruments and is discharged. ,
through the forward avionics center exhaust-fan.
3.2 TRANSFER FUNCTION MODELS FOR FORCED AIR FLOW
The airflow distributions are well known for all Integrated Pneumatic System
(IPS) operating configurations. While no test data exist on CF extraction efficien-
cies for the IPS components, standard road dust test data can be used to compute CF
transfer functions with reasonable accuracy. A model, based on conservation of mass
flow, is described for each IPS "flow pack shown in Figure 3-1.
The following nomenclature is used for the remainder of Chapter 3.
Q = Engine total inflow rate
Q = APU airflow rate
,r\Jr U
Q^ = High pressure cart airflow rate
= Preconditioned cart airflow rate
a. = Air flow rates ratio across component i
__ Air mass flow rate from component i
i Air mass flow rate into component i
4>. = CF flow mass ratio across component i
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,' _ CF mass flow rate out of component i
i CF- mass flow rate into component i
H. = CF or dust filtering efficiency of component i
3E = External CF exposure, fibers - sec/m
', 2
:
 E. = Internal CF exposure-, fibers - sec/m
C = External CF concentration, fibers/m
C. = Internal CF concentration, fibers/hi^
i TF = CF transfer function = E./E = C./C1 0 1 0
.'Note for filters and cleaners: <j> . = 1 - TJ .
3-6
ENGINE BLEED AIR MODEL
ENGINEj CLEANER
THRU |" SCAVENGE
FLOW I FLOW
ZONE TRIM BYPASS FLOW
ENGINE BLEED AIRFLOW MODEL1
CARBON FIBER FLOW MODEL!
1-*,
-ENGINESI
-BLEED AIR CLEANER
-ZONE TRIM BYPASS VALVE
-WATER SEPARATOR
-COLD AIR PLENUM
-COLD AIR PLENUM
-CABIN AND FLIGHT STATION
1 | - FLIGHT STATION INSTRUMENT PANEL
~2\ - PASSENGER CABIN AND AVIONIC CENTER
PASSENGER CABIN AND AVIONIC CENTERS
TF =
«1 a2 <*5 aG <*7
FLIGHT STATION INSTRUMENT PANEL
TF =
-H -
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AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) MODEL;
ot
apuf
'CLEANER
:SCAVENGE
FLOW
ZONE TRIM BYPASS FLOW)
APU AIRFLOW MODELS
APU CARBON FIBER FLOW MODELi
-APU
-BLEED AIR CLEANER
- ZONE TRIM BYPASS VALVE
-WATER SEPARATOR
(5) -COLD AIR PLENUM
(6) -COLD AIR PLENUM
(7) - CABIN AND FLIGHT STATION
1 | -FLIGHT STATION INSTRUMENT PANEL
~2~l - PASSENGER CABIN AND AVIONIC CENTER
PASSENGER CABIN AND AVIONIC CENTERS j
TF =
a1 02 *5 tt6 a7 (a3 a4 +1~
FLIGHT STATION INSTRUMENT PANEL
TF =
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HIGH PRESSURE CART (HP);MODEL
a-.
^—K3A
Ote a-
-H5) -K6J -K7) »2
1 - a. 1 - or,
CLEANER I .. I
SCAVENGE ZONE TRIM BYPASS FLOW
FLOW Q
HIGH PRESSURE CART AIRFLOW MODE Li
*HP!
4> 1 4>2 ^ ^4 ^«» ^R ^7
*®-2 Ks>^ K4) >(g>-^ —K§)-^  KD^—4T
1-< t>- i-+i
HIGH PRESSURE CART CARBON FIBER FLOW MODEL'
BLEED AIR CLEANER
ZONE TRIM BYPASS VALVE
WATER SEPARATOR
(5) -COLD AIR PLENUM
© -COLD AIR PLENUM
f?) - CABIN AND FLIGHT STATION
- FLIGHT STATION INSTRUMENT PANEL
- PASSENGER CABIN AND AVIONIC CENTER
PASSENGER CABIN AND AVIONIC CENTERS
TF =
FLIGHT STATION INSTRUMENT PANEL
TF =
(1 - <*6) («3 Qf4 +1 _ <*3)
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I Air Flow Mass Ratios (a)
The following air flow mass ratios are used in the IPS transfer function
models. The full flow entering the APU, HP cart, and PC cart is injected into.the
system. When the source is the engine, two percent of the total engine air flow
is bled for IPS supply during engine idle. Therefore:
0.02 (engine)
1.0 (APU, HP cart, PC cart)
The air cleaner operates with a force percent scavenge flow. Therefore:
j<*2 = 0.961
Two of the three refrigeration packs incorporate bypass flow capabilities.
The amount of bypass flow depends on the zone temperature trim requirements;
however, a typical value is 0.091 kg/s! from each of two packs or O.l82 kg/s total.
The total output from this three packs is 3-^02 kg/s.j Therefore, for the water
separator:
= 3.^ 02 - 0.182
*3 I 3.^ 02
and the bypass
= 0.053|
The total flow for APU operation is 2.990 kg/s;ihowever, the bypass flow would be
reduced proportionally and a would be the same.
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.The air loss from the water separator and the cold air plenum is negligible.
Therefore:
The cold air plenum receives the total output from the three packs . Of this ,
0.178 kg/s is ducted directly to the flight station instr\imenrt~paneT"and "tfie~"re^ "
mainder is ejected into the passenger cabin and flight station. Therefore to the
°6
passenger cabin and flight station:
= .9^ 8 (Engine, HP cart, PC cart)
(APU)
and toithe flight station instrument panel
.052 (Engine, HP cart, PC' cart)
.060 (APU)
The air loss from;the passenger cabin and flight station is negligible,
Therefore:
a = 1.0
The mass flow ratios are summarized in Table 3-1.
Carbon Fiber Particle Size and Shape
The test data on particle extraction efficiencies of L-1011 components are
for a spectrum of sizes of road dust. In order to apply.these data to CF, the
characteristics of CP must be related to the characteristics of road dust. The
three primary characteristics that affect the extraction efficiencies are size,
shape, and density. They affect filter efficiencies and dynamic forces (centrif-
ugal, coriolis, aerodynamic drag.,- and gravity) which are important in assessing
the attenuation of the components employing centrifugal extraction and in settling.
NASA studies and tests have added a limited amount of CF data to the data base and
will be used, where applicable, to substantiate the extraction efficiencies derived
in the following section.
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TABLE 3-1. SUMMARY OF MASS FLOW RATIOS
QUANTITY
<*-,1
«2
"3
ah
5
V
<?„
7
*1
«j>2 .
4>3
£l
P^tr
*6
*T
SOURCE
ENGINES
0.02
0.96
0.9^ 7
1.0
1.0
0.9U8
1.0
0.003
0.05
0.9^ 7
o.oU
1.0
0..9U8
0.5
APU
1.0
0.96
0.9^ 7
1.0 '
1.0
0.9^ 0
1.0
1.0
0.05
0.9^ 7
o.oU
1.0
0.9^ 0
0.5
HP CART
1.0
0.96
0.9^ 7
1.0
1.0
0.9^ 8 '
1.0
1.0
0.05
0.9^ 7
o.oH
1.0
0.9W
0.5
• PC CART
1.0
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.9U8
1.0
0.005
NA
NA
NA
NA .
0.9^ 8
0.5
NA - Not Applicable
NASA composite "burn tests and equipment vulnerability tests have shown that
CF'length "between one and ten millimeters I constitute the range of concern. Very
few released fibers exceed 10 mm and fibers less than 1 mm pose little, if any,
hazard to electrical equipment. Since particle extraction efficiencies increase
with the size of the particle, a single CF length at the lower end of the spectrum,
1.5 mm, is conservatively selected for the derivation of the transfer functions.
Since free CF are flexible, their straight cylindrical shape will be deformed
in unknown ways under the high forces imposed by the high flow rates through the
IPS. Therefore it is reasonable to assume a 7-5[J-m diameter by 1500pim long fiber can
be represented by an equal volume 50«2(im diameter sphere. |
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The settling rate for 50(jjn road dust is 8-10 m/min compared to 1-92 m/min!
average settling rate for CF. Since the extraction efficiency of centrifugal
filters increases with density for particles of equal size and shape 'and settling
rate also increases with density, the extraction efficiency for road dust should be
greater than for CF. However, NASA studies show that fibers disintegrate under the
high forces imposed by a centrifugal air cleaner which would more than compensate
for the. lower extraction efficiency. Therefore CF mass flow ratios are derived
from 50fjjn road dust test data.i
CF.Mass Flow Ratios (4>)
The following CF'mass flow ratios are used in the IPS transfer function models.
Road dust ingestion test results on L-1011 engines at idle show that an average of
17$ of the ingested coarse (<l).OpM dust mass per unit bleed air flow mass would be
ejected into the bleed air system. Since the bleed air supply is 2% of the engine
air flow:
<t> = 0.17 x 0.02 = 0.003 (Engine)
This value assumes no change in the spectrum of CF lengths. Studies conducted by
NASA concluded that CF is too fragile to withstand the high forces imposed on them
during the passage through the engine compressor stages. The fibers would disinte-
grate into lengths too short to cause equipment failures and therefore the transfer
function through an engine would be zero.
The APU supply has no filtering. Therefore:
^ = 1.0 (APU)
The HP carts have a wide range of extraction efficiencies, varying from filter
efficiencies of 0.998 for 50(4;m road dust "to fio "filters. For this analysis a worst
case i s used. Therefore: " - "
> = 1.0 (HP cart)
A preconditioned air (PC) cart used by several L-1011 operators contains a
series of four filters in the inlet. Based oil the vork on filter efficiencies pub- ,
.lished under Phase I of this program, it is estimated that this PC cart has a CF
extraction efficiency of at least 0.995- Therefore:
4> . = 0.005 (PC cart)
Tests on the "bleed air cleaner show that the extraction efficiency for particles
in hO^ .m - 6o/im range is 95$- Therefore: !•
<j>2 = 0.05
Tests conducted by NASA on a different air cleaner show the extraction efficiency
', ____ _ __ _ .
for 1-3 mm long.\CF is greater than 99-5$. ,
'
Dust extraction tests were not conducted on the water separator. A fabric
filter collects water in the coalescer which is separated from the airstream by
centrifugal force in the vortex generator. Test data show the average droplet size
of the water emerging from the coalescer is 25(J.\m and the water extraction efficiency
is 96%. It is estimated that the water separator is at least as effective in re-
moving 50[xm solid particles}. The bypass flow is not filtered. Therefore to the
water separator:
4>3 = a3 = 0.9VT
and the bypass: .
( 1 -4>3 =0.053
and for the water separator:
- - - - <t>, = o.oU ,
Tests conducted by NASA on a similar water separator show the extraction efficiency
for 1-3 mm long CF is greater than 99-3%.
The high velocities in the cold air plenum and duct to the flight station
instrument panel would produce negligible CF attenuation. Therefore
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<t>
0.9^ 8 (Engine, HP cart, PC cart)
0.9UO (APU)
0.052 (Engine, HP cart, PC cart)
0.060 (APU)
.
The air from the cold air plenum is more or less uniformly distributed to all
areas of the passenger ca~bin and flight station. The flow is sufficient to displace
the encapsulated air every five to six minutes generating air velocities that are
seldom less than six meters per minute. Since the CF settling rate is approximately
one third of the air velocity, CF would tend to remain airborne. However, the air-
flow forms circular patterns and many CF would be entrapped in the carpets and
interior furnishings prior to infiltrating electrical and electronic equipments in
these compartments which are located behind shrouds. The air is ejected to the
underfloor compartments through vents located in the cabin sidewalls at the floor
line. It is estimated that at least 50% of the CF would be entrapped in the passen-
ger cabin. Therefore':
The CF mass flow ratios are summarized in Table 3-1.
3.3 TRANSFER FUNCTION ESTIMATES" "FOR OPEN EXTERNAL DOORS
A normal operating configuration, particularly during maintenance, consists of
supplying external electrical power to aircraft while various external doors are
open. Whenever electrical power is supplied, exhaust fans discharge air directly
from the avionic service centers to provide convective cooling for the equipment.
This generates a flow through all the many interconnected compartments in the fuse-
lage both above and below the passenger cabin floor resulting in air ingestion
through open doors. The precise distribution of airflow, throughout, the aircraft
has. never been investigated for this configuration, or more accurately configura-
tions since it would be affected by which combination of eight passenger and
two avionic center doors are open and the external wind velocity and direction.
Without precise knowledge of the airflow distribution, the transfer functions
cannot be calculated accurately. However, the transfer functions can be estimated
from certain data that are available.
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Avionic Center Doors Open
With the avionic center doors open, air is ingested directly into the
compartment and exhausted through the equipment. The.flov rates are high so there
will "be little attenuation of CF for equipment vithin the avionic centers. However,
very little ingested air will circulate through the passenger cabin and flight
station and any CF would settle before the equipment in these areas could be con-. -
taminated. Therefore a reasonable estimate for the purpose of this study is trans-
fer functions of one for the avionic centers and zero for the passenger cabin and
flight- station.
Passenger Cabin Doors Open
Measured temperature decay rates in the avionic service centers show that air
ingested through the passenger doors mixes very slowly with the encapsulated air.
This indicates that most of the ingested air distributes throughout the length of
the passenger cabin before passing through the floor at the sidewall vents into the
many underfloor compartments before finally being exhausted from the avionic service
centers. Since the capacities of the exhaust fans would require approximately
twenty-five minutes and fifty minutes, respectively, for the forward and aft fans
to displace the volume of encapsulated air, the flow rates would be very low com-
pared to the settling rate of CF. Therefore, CF would be heavily attenuated by
settling and entrapment by the carpet and furnishings of the passenger cabin.
Additional attenuation would result from obstructions (structure, installations,
insulation, etc.) in the below floor compartments. It is estimated that less than
one percent of the air could reach the service centers with any appreciable amount
of CF. Therefore, a transfer function of 0.01 is considered a realistic estimate
for the avionic service centers.
Since essentially all potentially vulnerable equipment in the passenger cabin
and flight stations are located behind shrouds in the upper portion of the compart-
ment, the exposure to these components will be minimal due to the settling" rate of
the fibers. A transfer function of 0.01 is used for the entire aircraft with open
passenger doors.
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Cargo and Galley Doors Open
The cargo compartments on the L-1011 are sealed to prevent the flow of oxygen
to sustain a fire. Any CF ingested through an open cargo door would be contained
within the cargo compartment and the transfer function would essentially "be zero.
No further consideration is given to this configuration.
There are two means of access to the mid avionics service center, through the
avionics center door and through an internal door from the galley. Access through
the galley is the means normally used on the L-1011 and when the external galley
door is also open, there would be little attenuation of CF. For the purpose of this
study, either configuration is considered to have a transfer function equal to one
and is categorized as an "avionic service center door open" configuration. When the
internal door between the galley and the avionic service center is closed and its
external galley door open, the transfer function would be similar to that for an
open passenger door and is included in that configuration.
3.k SUMMARY OF TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
The transfer functions calculated by the forced air flow models of Section 3.2
and estimated in Section 3.3 are.summarized in Table 3-2. These values were
derived considering a single source of CF ingestions. During ground operation,
the aircraft will often be subject to CF ingestion from more than one source
(e.g., APU operating with passenger doors open, both avionic center and passenger
doors open, etc.). For multiple source configurations, the largest transfer func-
tion from any single source is conservatively used in the risk assessment. The
actual value is between the values for the single sources. The multiple source
transfer functions tabulated in Table 3-3 are used for the risk assessments of
this report.
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TABLE 3-2. L-1011 TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
CF SOURCE
Engine
APU
HP Cart
PC Cart
Avionic
Doors Open
Passenger
Doors Open
AIRCRAFT LOCATION
AVIONIC
CENTERS
o.oooU
0.0025
0.0021+
0.0025
1.0
0.01
PASSENGER
CABIN
O.OOOU
0.0025
0.002U
0.0025
0
0.01
FLIGHT STATION
PANEL
0.0008
0.0050
o.ooUT
0.0050
0
0.01
TABLE 3-3. TRANSFER FUNCTIONS FOR MULTIPLE INGESTION SOURCES •
AVIONIC CENTER DOORS
AIRCRAFT
LOCATION
Avionic
Centers
Passenger
Cabin
Flight
Station
AIRCRAFT
POWER
Engine
APU
Air Cart
Ground Elec .
None
Engine
APU
Air Cart
Ground Elec.
None
Engine
APU
Air Cart
Ground Elec.
None
OPEN CLOSED
: PASSENGER DOORS
OPEN
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
CLOSED
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.000k
0.0025
0.0025
0
0
0.0008
0.0050
0.0050
0
0
OPEN
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
CLOSED
o.oooi*
0.0025
0.0025
0
Parked
o.oooU
0.0025
0,0025
0
Parked
0.0008
0.0050
0.0050
0
Parked
Note: Air Cart applies to either HP Cart or PC Cart.
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CHAPTER U
STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT OF AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AT AIRPORTS
This assessment provides data required to evaluate the risk to commercial
transport aircraft. The first part of this study estimates the population of
aircraft at airports as a function of aircraft size, time of day and.operational
mode. These data form the basis for establishing the probabilities of aircraft
exposure contained in Appendix C. The second part of this study estimates the
time distribution of aircraft configurations within the operational mode as the
basis for establishing aircraft transfer function distributions.
The burden of this study was shared by the airframe manufacturers. The work
performed by Lockheed is documented in this chapter along with a summary of the
results from the other manufacturers.
k.l AIRCRAFT POPULATIONS IN AIRPORT OPERATIONAL MODES
Nine airports were analyzed to provide a statistical data base for the simula-
tion analysis contained in Appendix C. The airports are:
Washington National (DCA)
Hartsfield-Atlanta (ATL)
Miami International (MIA)
St. Louis Lambert (STL)
New York Kennedy (JFK)
Chicago O'Hare (ORD)
Boston Logan (BOS)
Philadelphia International (PHL)
New York LaGuardia (LGA)
The first three airports were analyzed by Lockheed, the next three were
analyzed by the Douglas Aircraft Company and the last three by the Boeing commercial
Airplane Company.
The expected number of aircraft on the ground at these airports was required
for input to the simulation model. The three airports analyzed "by Lockheed are
described in the following section.
il.1.1 Analysis of Operations at Three Airports
It was required that the data on aircraft populations at airports be developed
by time of day, aircraft size and operational mode. • To ensure compatibility of re-
sults for all nine airports, the following definitions were established:
Time of Day
Day - 6 AM to 9 PM!(0601-2100)
Night - 9 PM to 6 AM (2101-0600)
Aircraft Size .
Large - 7^ 7, DC-10, L-1011
Medium - A300, DC-8-60 (Series)
Small - All other commercial jets not included above.
(Note: Propeller driven aircraft and small non-commercial jets are excluded.)
Operating Modes
In maintenance
At the Gate (Ramp)
Parked
Aircraft In Maintenance
Existing data on aircraft in maintenance were insufficient. Therefore, it was
necessary to contact airport officials, airline maintenance personnel and resident
field service representatives to establish the populations of aircraft in mainte-
nance. Table h-I. shows the number of aircraft in maintenance that were estimated
for the three airports analyzed. The estimates are given for the day and night
periods and by aircraft size. Washington National Airport operations are restricted
to small aircraft and no significant maintenance is performed.
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TABLE U-l. AVERAGE AIRCRAFT POPULATIONS IN
MAINTENANCE AT THREE AIRPORTS
PERIOD
Day
(0601-2100)
Night
(2101-0600)
SIZE
CATEGORY
Small
Medium
r
 .Large
Small
Medium
Large
AIRPORT
WASHINGTON
NATIONAL
-0-
-0-
ATLANTA
10
1
2
16
1
3
MIAMI
h
-0-
3
8
2.
6
Aircraft Movements
Aircraft movements at each airport were available from a computer print-out of
an official Airline Guide tape. It contained, the arrival and departure times of
scheduled flights "by aircraft type and airline. For this study, movements through
each airport during one typical day were analyzed. The information evaluated at
each airport is summarized in Table U-2. The total movements (arrivals and depar-
tures) scheduled on each date are shown along with the percentabe-of the total for
the day and night periods. The number of aircraft movements applicable to this
analysis are shown by size category. As noted earlier, propeller driven aircraft
and small non-commercial jets are not included in this study.
Table U-3 lists the applicable aircraft types found at each airport. At the
present time, operators are restricted to small aircraft at Washington National
Airport.
In analyzing movements of applicable aircraft, the ground times were calculated
for through flights and for turnaround flight. The ground time of through flights
is the difference between their arrival and departure times. However, turnaround
flights change flight numbers.-- Therefore, ground times were calculated by matching
arrivals and departures according to aircraft type and airline on a "first in, first
out" basis. These calculations established the time interval each aircraft was on
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"TABLE k-2. AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS AT THREE AIRPORTS
Date
Total Aircraft
Movement s
Day
, (0601-2100)
Percent
Night
(2101-0600)
Applicable Aircraft
Movements' -*- '
Small
SMe . . Medium
Large
AIRPORT
WASHINGTON
NATIONAL
Feb. 15, 1979
T26
91.1*
Q.9%
550
550
ATLANTA
Feb. 16, 1979
1527
81*. 2*
15.8*
130k
112k
56
12U
MAIMI
Feb. 17, 1979
851
81*. 5*
15.5*.
728
55^
U8
126
(1)Propeller aircraft and small business jets excluded.
on the ground. The number for each aircraft' size category were counted at fifteen :;-
minute intervals for the entire 24-hour period to obtain average populations by
hour and for the day and night periods.
When an airplane moves through an airport, the time on the ground is spent "at
the gate." If an aircraft remains at an airport for an extended period of time, it
will very likely be "parked" for some portion of the time, especially aircraft that
l
remain overnight. The number of overnight aircraft at each airport is shown in
Table k~k. In this analysis, the overnights and long afternoon stays had their
i ground times allocated between time uat the gate" and "parked." The allocation
:
 for each.airport is discussed below along with results of the analysis.
TABLE H-3. TYPES OF AIRCRAFT AT THREE AIRPORTS
AIRPORT
Washington
National
Hartsfield-
Atlanta
International
Miami
Int ernat i onal
AIRCRAFT SIZE
SMALL
BAC-111
DC-9
727
737
707
727
737
DC-8 (excl -60)
DC-9
BAC-111
707
720
727
737
DC-8 (excl -60)
DC-9
MEDIUM
-None
A300
DC-8-60 (series)
A300
DC-8-60 (series)
LARGE
-None-
L-1011
7^ 7
L-1011.
DC-10
TABLE 4-U. OVERNIGHT AIRCRAFT POPULATIONS AT THREE AIRPORTS
SIZE
Small
Medium
Large
TOTAL
AIRPORT
WASHINGTON
NATIONAL
•_ 27
'
00
27
ATLANTA
2.U
3
6
33
MAIMI
52
h
7
63
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Table U-5 presents a summary of the results of the analyses for the three
airports. The average number of aircraft during'the day and night periods are
shown by aircraft size and operational mode. These averages were determined from
hourly.tabulations contained in Appendix B.
Only small aircraft operate at Washington National Airport, due to a current
aircraft size restriction. Another restriction at Washington National Airport is
an operating curfew between the hours of 11 PM (2300) and 7 AM (0700).
TABLE U-5. 'AVERAGE AIRCRAFT POPULATIONS AT THREE AIRPORTS
AIRPORT
Washington
National
Atlanta
Miami
AIRCRAFT
SIZE
Small
Medium
Large
Small
Medium
Large
Small
Medium
Large
PERIOD
DAY
(0601 - 2100)
NIGHT
(2101 - 0600)
OPERATIONAL MODE
GATE
16.05
30.73
2.U7
.U.10
19.03
2.60
5.88
MAINT.
0.00
10.00
1.00
2.00
U.OO
0.00
3.00 '
PARKED
0.93
1-25
0.20
0.00
5.>*3
0.00
0.92
GATE
9.86
25-50
1.67
3.86
29.75
3.33
5.11
-MAINT.
0.00
16.00
1.00
3.00
8.00
2.00
6.00
PARKED
16.17
5.83
0.00
0.00
12.08
0.00
- i.if-U
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This restriction results in twenty-seven (27) overnights that; spend part of the
time "at the gate" and the remainder of the time "parked." To account for this
effect, it was estimated that a small size aircraft would spend thirty (30) minutes
at the gate after its arrival to unload passengers and baggage plus thirty (30)
minutes before its departure to load passengers and baggage. In addition, it was
estimated that three (3) hours were spent during the night to service each aircraft
and the remainder of the time the aircraft was in a "parked" condition. The time
"at the gate" for arrivals and departures is identified by the schedule but the time
"'at the gate" for servicing was spread equally between 10 PM and 7 AM> "';V,e- uv^ ••:,.-\: ,
The approach used for Hartsfield-Atlanta Airport was essentially the same as
Washington National Airport except that overnights and long stays at this airport
i
were treated somewhat differently because of the more extensive maintenance capa-
bilities at this airport and the existence of medium and large size aircraft.
Small'size aircraft were still allocated thirty (30) minutes on the ramp after
their arrival for unloading passengers and baggage plus thirty. (30) minutes before
their departure for loading passengers; but medium and large size aircraft were
allowed sixty (60) minutes in each case. However, all size airc'raft staying over-
night or having a long stay during the day would be allowed four (U) hours of
servicing. Since the airport is operating every hour, the usual maintenance prac^
tice would be to service the aircraft immediately after debarking passengers and
then place the aircraft in a parked condition until preparation for departure.
The data for Miami International Airport 'were developed in the same manner as
Hartsfield-Atlanta International Airport.
it.1.2 Summary of Operations at Nine Airports
The results for all nine airports are summarized in Table U-6. Since parked
aircraft are closed shut and invulnerable to carbon fiber (CF) contamination
damage they have not been included in this summary.
TABLE U-6. AVERAGE AIRCFAFT POPULATIONS AT NINE AIRPORTS
AIRPORT
ORD
JKF
'.. STL
LGA
BOS
PHL
DCA
ATL
MIA
AIRCRAFT
"SIZE "
Small
Medium
Large
Small
Medium
Large
Small
Medium
Large
Small
Medium
Large
Small.
Medium
Large
Small
Medium
Large
Small
Small
Medium
Large
Small
Medium
Large
DAYTIME
GATE
Ul.lt
2.8
9.8
Uo.7
3.'8
10.3 •
17.2
0.6
0.6
18.3
0
0.8
lU.9
0.9
2.3
.8.3
0.5
1.5
16.1
30.7
2.5
U.I
19.0-
2.6
5.9
MAINT.
9-0
0
2.0
8.0
0
2.0
2.0
0
0
0.1
0
0
2.2
0
0
0.2
0
0
0
10.0
1.0
2.0
U.O
0
3.0
NIGHTTIME
GATE
17-7
l.U
U.5
8.U
1.6
5.8
6.1
0.1
O.U
13.2
0
1.1
16.7
0.3.
1.3
9.6
0.1
•1.9
9.9
25.5
1.7
3.9
29.7
3.3
5.1
MAINT.
19.0
1.0
5..0 -
18.0
5.0
8.0
U.O
0
0
20.0
1.0
0
13.0
0
1.0
0
0
0
0
16.0
1.0
3.0
8.0
2.0
6.0
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U.2 AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS WITHIN OPERATIONAL MODES
Time distributions of potentially vulnerable aircraft configurations within
the operational modes are required to establish transfer- function distributions for
the aircraft risk assessments. This work was divided between Boeing and Lockheed.^
Boeing analyzed the igate mode and Lockheed analyzed the maintenance mode which is
described in the following section.
it.2.1 Analysis of Configurations in Maintenance Mode
Maintenance operations at Los Angeles -International Airport (LAX) are considered
representative of airports with major maintenance facilities. No significant dif-
ference between day and night maintenance practices could be identified that could
result in a difference in the distribution of maintenance configurations, even
though there would be a difference in the number of aircraft during these periods.
Therefore, the time distributions derived in this section are applicable to the
maintenance mode for both day and night operations.
Two surveys were conducted at LAX to analyze maintenance mode's. • The first was
to observe and record aircraft configurations during periodic jtrips to the various
maintenance facilities at the airport. The second survey consisted of obtaining
estimates of configuration distributions from maintenance personnel at four
airlines.
For the first survey, two hundred and twenty-one observations were-made of
aircraft inside of or in the immediate vicinity of maintenance hangers. These
observations were made at various times of the day and night over a four day
period. The sample shown in Table .k-7 consists of various combinations of the
following parameters affecting the distribution of aircraft configurations.
aircraft size small, large
hanger location inside, outside
avionic doors . ' open, closed
passenger doors open, closed
power to aircraft ground electrical, APU operating
engine operating, no power
No medium size aircraft were observed during the times'the sample was taken. Also,
no air carts were seen providing power to an aircraft. Therefore these parameters
were not included in Table k—7-
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TABLE U-7. STATISTICAL SAMPLE OF AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS IN
MAINTENANCE MODE
POWER TO
' AIRCRAFT
Grd
Elect
Open
APU
Open
Eng
Open
No
Pwr
AVIONIC
DOORS
Open
. Closed
Open
Closed
Open
Closed
Open
Closed
AIRCRAFT SIZE
SMALL LARGE
HANGAR LOCATION
INSIDE OUTSIDE INSIDE OUTSIDE
PASSENGER DOORS
OPEN
51
3
X
X
X
X
1
2
CLOSED
0 •
0
X
X
x :
X
0
0
OPEN
58
IT
3
0
1-
0
" 0
2
CLOSED
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
6
OPEN
13
2
X
X
X
X
1
1
CLOSED
0
0
x •
X
X
X
0
0
OPEN
33
1
k
2
i
0
2
2
CLOSED
0
0
1
1 '
0
0
0
5
SAMPLE TOTAL: 221 observations
The second survey was conducted during the same four day period that" the sam-
ples observations were taken. Four airlines, having major maintenance facilities
at LAX were contacted. The estimates for fraction of time in various aircraft con-
figurations obtained from maintenance personnel at each airline are shown in . "
Table 4-8.
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TABLE U-8.. AIRLINE PERSONNEL ESTIMATES OF AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
IN MAINTENANCE MODE
CONDITION
Pass.
Doors
Open
Ground
Elect.
Power
Avionic
Doors
Open
APU
Operating
Engines
Operating
HP Cart
LP Cart
HANGAR
AREA
Inside
Outside
Inside
Outside
Inside
Outside
Inside
Outside
Inside
Outside
Inside
Outside
Inside
Outside
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE
AIRLINE
A
100$
100$
100$
90%
10$ Large
100$ Small
10$ Large
100$ Small
0$
<10$ Large
.60$ Small
' 0$
5$
0$
<-5$
0$
0$
B
100$
100$
100$
85$
100$
75$
0$
15$
r\(rf(j/o
<5$
0$
<1$
0$
. <1$
c
100$
100$
100$
85-90$
100$
90$
0$
10-15$
0$
1$
0$
0$
r\Gl
0/0
r\0f(J/o
D
95$
95$
100$
93-9W
90$
• 90$
0$
. 6-7$
r\of(J/o •
1$
0$
0$
0$
0$
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'Using the two surveys as a basis, the fraction of time for various aircraft
configurations in the maintenance mode was established and is summarized in
Table h-9~ Only the parameters, avionic doors, passenger doors and power to air-
craft are included in the table. Aircraft size and hangar area are statistically
insignificant in establishing the configuration time distributions.
k.2.2 Summary of Configurations in All Modes
The information in Table U-9 along with the results obtained by Boeing for the
gate mode, are summarized in Table U-10. In the case of the gate mode, the day and .
i
night periods show a significant difference in the configuration distributions. ;
TABLE k-9. TIME DISTRIBUTION OF AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS IN
MAINTENANCE MODE
FRACTION OF TIME
POWER
TO
AIRCRAFT
APU
Engines
Air Cart
Elect Cart
None
AVIONIC DOORS
:
 OPEN CLOSED
PASSENGER DOORS
OPEN
0.033
0.010
. 0.010
0.727
0.019
CLOSED OPEN
0.005
-0-
-0-
• -o-
-0-
0.010
,-0-
-0-
0.138
0.033
CLOSED
0.005 '
0.010
-0-
-0-
Parked
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TABLE U-10. SUMMAEY OF TIME DISTRIBUTIONS OF AIRCRAFT
CONFIGURATIONS FOR ALL OPERATIONAL MODES
FRACTION OF TIME PER OPEATIONAC MODE' .
OPERATIONAL
MODE
Gate,
Day
Gate, '
Night
Maintenance
POWER TO
AIRCRAFT
APU
Engine
Air Cart
Ground Elect
None
APU
Engine
Air Cart
Ground Elect
None
APU
Engine
Air Cart
Ground Elect
None
AVIONIC DOORS
OPEN CLOSED
PASSENGER DOORS
OPEN
0 . 01
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
0.30
-0-
0.033
0.010
0.010
0.727
0.019
CLOSED
-0-
-0-
- -0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
0.005
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
OPEN
0.95
-0-
-0-
o.ok
-0-
0.18
0.02
-0-
0.50
-0-
0.010
-0-
-0-
0.138
0.033
CLOSED
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
Parked
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
Parked
•0.005
0.-010
-0-
-0-
Parked
• Using the results shown in Table 3-3 and Table_U-10, the. distribution of time
for the carbon fiber (CF) transfer functions for each location in the aircraft was
determined. Tables U-ll, k-12, and U-13 show, respectively, the time.distributions
for the avionic centers, passenger cabin and flight station areas. These tables
will be. used in the following chapter.
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TABLE U-ll. TIME DISTRIBUTION.OF CF TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
FOR AVIONIC CENTERS
^^ "^ ^^  ' OPERATIONAL
^^ ^^  MODE
TRANSFER ^^ -^^ ^^
FUNCTION ^^ -^-^ ^
,-
1/0
0.01.
0.0025
o.oooi*
FRACTION OF TIME
GATE-DAY
0.010
o.oUo
0.950
' -0-
GATE-NIGHT
0.300
0.700
-0-
-0-
MAINTENANCE
0.80U
0.138
O.OU8
0.010
TABLE U-12. TIME DISTRIBUTION OF CF TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
FOR PASSENGER CABIN
^^ -^\^  OPERATIONAL
^^ \^ ^ MODE
TRANSFER "^"\-^ ^
FUNCTION ' ^^ ^^ ^
0.01
0.0025
o.oooU
FRACTION OF TIME
GATE-DAY
1.0
0
0
GATE-NIGHT
1.0
0
0
MAINTENANCE
0.98
0.01
0.01
TABLE it-13. TIME DISTRIBUTION OF CF TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
FOR FLIGHT STATION
^^ ^ OPERATIONAL
^^ ^^ ^ . MODE
TRANSFER ^^ ^^ ^^
FUNCTION \^
0.01
0.005
0.0008
FRACTION OF TIME
GATE-DAY
1.0
0
0
GATE-NIGHT
1.0
0
0'
MAINTENANCE .
0.98
0.01
0.01
U-iU
CHAPTER 5
PROBABILITY OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FAILURES CONDITIONAL
ON AIRCRAFT EXTERNAL CF EXPOSURE
Each of the potentially vulnerable pieces of electrical and electronic
ment , identified in Chapter 2, presents a risk of failing wherever the L-1011 •
is subjected to an external CF exposure. The level of risk depends on the con-
ditional probabilities that the equipments fail given the exposure. These pro-
babilities are a function of the following variables:
• The magnitude of the external exposure, E
• The vulnerability of the individual piece of equipment indicated by its
mean exposure for failure, E
• The location of the equipment in the aircraft and the operating configura-
tion of the aircraft to establish the CF transfer function to the equip-
ment, TF
• The operational mode of the aircraft to define the time distribution of
transfer functions within each operational, mode.
The conditional probabilities of failure can easily be calculated from the data
developed in Chapters 2 - U.
Analysis of data compiled from equipment vulnerability tests, conducted under
the direction of NASA, has shown that it is reasonable to represent the CF exposure
level at the equipment causing failure as an exponentially distributed random
variable characterized by the mean exposure to failure. Also the exposure at the .
equipment is related to the aircraft external exposure by the transfer function
associated with the specific aircraft configuration. Therefore, each equipment
in the same aircraft location with the '• same mean exposure to failure will have
i
the same probability of failure under identical conditions of aircraft configura-
tion and external exposure. Since the same aircraft location and mean exposure to
failure were necessary conditions for establishing the equipment groups in
Appendix A, the probability of failure is described by:
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P,- ,v = 1 - e
where :
E. = mean exposure to failure for equipment in group i ~ fiber-sec/in
2
E. = a discrete aircraft external exposure ~ fiber-sec /in
J
(TF) = the transfer function for group i associated with the specific aircraft
configuration k
therefore:
Pr°bability of failure for each equipment in group i conditional -
on the aircraft being in -r-onfiguration k and' exposed to the discrete
exposure E . .
J
The time distribution of transfer functions, derived in Section U.3, can
readily be ^ combined with the above conditional probabilities to produce the pro-
bability of equipment failure conditional on the aircraft external exposure for
each of the aircraft operational modes described in Section U.I. This is described
by.
where:
p = the fraction of time the aircraft is in the configuration k that defines
the transfer function (TF)^ , for the equipment group i.. The set of all
k within an operational mode produces a mutually exclusive exhaustive
set of probabilities.
Therefore:
P.. = the probability of failure for each equipment in group i conditional on
the aircraft being exposed to the discrete exposure Ej within ah opera-
tional mode. -•
For each of the three airport operational modes (gate-day, gate-night, mainte-
nance), the conditional probabilities, P±i, are listed in Tables 5-1> 5-2, and 5-3
for several levels of aircraft external exposure. These probabilities are used in
risk analyses contained in the following chapters.
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TABLE 5-1. PROBABILITY OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE CONDITIONAL ON
AIRCRAFT EXTERNAL CF EXPOSURE IN GATE-DAY MODE
EQUIP
GROUP
i~
Group A
Avionic
Centers
¥=1.5xlOT
Group B
' Flight
Station
- 8
E= 1.0x10
Groups C&D
Passenger
Cabin
— 8
E=1.0xlO
Groups E-H
Avionic
Centers
8
E=l . 0x10
TRANSFER
FUNCTION
DISTRIBUTION
Table b-11
Table U-12
Table U-13
Table k-ll
•PROBABILITY OF FAILURE: GATE - DAY
: EXPOSURE LEVEL - E
3.2xl03
2.72x10
3.20xlO~T
3 . 20xlO~T
U.09xlO~T
3 . 2x10
2.72xlO~5
3.20xlO~6
3.20x10
h . 09x10"
3.2xl05
2.70x10
3.20xlO~5
3.20xlO~5
k . 08xlO~5
3 . 2x10
2. 51x10" 3
3 . 20x10
3.20x10
it.O^xlO"
j 3.2xlOT
I.it7xl0~2
3.'?-9xlO"3
3.19xlO~3
3.63xlO~3
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TABLE 5-2. PROBABILITY OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE CONDITIONAL ON AIRCRAFT
EXTERNAL CP EXPOSURE IN GATE - NIGHT MODE . .
EQUIP
GROUP
"i
Group A
Avionic
Centers
1=1 . 5xlOT
Group B
Flight
Station
E=1.0xlO
Groups C&D
Passenger
Cabin
o
E=1.0xlO
Groups E-H
Avionic
Centers
Q
E=1.0xlO
TRANSFER
FUNCTION
DISTRIBUTION
Table U-ll
Table U-12
Table U-13
Table U-ll
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE: GATE - NIGHT
EXPOSURE LEVEL - E |
3 . 2xl03
6.5UxlO~5
\
3 . 20xlO~T
3.20xlO~7
9.82xlO~6
3 . 2x10
6 .5^ xio~lt
3.20xlO~6
3 . 20x10"
9.'32xlO~5
3 . 2xl05
6 ,^ 8xlO~3
3.20xlO~5
3.20xlO~5
-U9.i79xlO
3 . 2x10
5.'91xlO~2
3.20x10
_lt
3.20x10
9.'6?xlO~3
3 . 2xlOT
2 .179X10'1
3.p-9xlO~3
3.19xlO~3
|8.UUxio~2
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TABLE 5-3. PROBABILITY OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE CONDITIONAL ON AIRCRAFT
EXTERNAL CF EXPOSURE IN MAINTENANCE MODE
EQUIP
GROUP
E~
Group A
Avion! c
Centers
¥=1 . 5xlOT
Group B
. Flight
Station
Q
E=l . 0x10
Groups C&D
Passenger
Cabin
o
E=1.0xlO
Groups E-H
Avionic
Centers
0
E=1.0xlO
TRANSFER
FUNCTION
DISTRIBUTION
Table U-ll
Table U-12
Table H-13
Table U-ll
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE: MAINTENANCE
EXPOSURE LEVEL - E
3 . 2xl03
-U
1 . 7*2x10
3 . 15xlO~T
3.li5xlO"T
2. 58x10" 5
3.2x10
1 . 72xlO~3
3.15xlO~6
3.15xlO~6
2 . 58xlO~U
3.2xl05'
1.70xlO~2
3. 15x10" 5
3.i5xio~5
2.57xlO~3
3.2xl06
1 . 55X10'1
3.l5xlO~U
-U3.15x10
2.5! x^l°~2
3.2xlOT
7.12X10"1
3.1/+xlO~3
3.1lUxlO~3
2 . 20JxlO~1
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 CHAPTER.'6
EXPECTED INCREASE IN EQUIPMENT FAILURES DUE TO CF CONTAMINATION
The probabilities of equipment failure conditional on the CF exposure from
'.the-previous chapter can be combined with the expected frequency the L-1011 fleet
vill experience various CF exposure levels to determine the expected number of
electrical and electronic equipment failures resulting from CF contamination. The
expected number of failures due to CF contaimination can be compared to the expected
number of failures due to current sources to assess the relative impact on the _
equipment failure burden for L-1011 operators. Since the source of CF contamina-
tion is free fibers released from fires on commercial transport aircraft incorpora-
ting CF composite materials, the frequency and magnitude of CF exposures is directly
related to the utilization of composite materials. Only small quantities of this
material are incorporated on a small portion of the commercial fleet at this time.
However, airframe manufacturers project dramatic increased use of composite •
materials in the next ten to fifteen years. To reflect this phenomena, the analyses
in this and subsequent chapters are based on the U.S. commercial transport fleet
projected for the year 1993.
Appendix C contains the expected number of aircraft exposed to various dis-
crete CF exposure levels for the year 1993. This analysis, conducted by ... •". ...
Arthur D. Little, Inc., employed a Monte Carlo simulation using a CF dispersion
and risk analysis model. The simulation was performed for the nine major U.S.
airports described in Section k.I. and incorporated data on the aircraft populations
at these airports, contained in Table U-6 along with the airframe manufacturer's
projected utilization of composite materials for the 1993 U.S. commercial trans-
port fleet. Table 22 of Appendix C presents the total number of aircraft exposed
to various exposure levels annually. In order to apply the data in Table 22,
.Appendix C to the analysis of the L-1011 fleet, the fraction of total fleet ex-
posures expected to be L-1011's is determined from the projected fleet composition
for the year 1993. Forcasts of U.S. fleet requirements for 1993 show the need for
27^ 0 total aircraft of which 1^ 00 are large aircraft. It is estaimated that one
third, or U67, of the large aircraft will be L-10111s. Therefore, the expected
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number of total fleet exposures in Table 22 of Appendix C is reduced by the ratio
1*67/27^ 0 to produce the expected number-of L-1011 fleet exposure. The annual
expected number of exposures in the year 1993 for the L-1011 U.S. fleet are listed
in Table 6-1 for the aircraft operational modes susceptible to CF contamination;
gate-day, gate-night and maintenance. The exposure levels in this Table range
o « R ' -from 1CP - 10° fiber-seconds per cubic meter, the discrete value 3.2 x,10
~ -._^ .
representing the geometric mean of the range |10 -__10_ __j_ Equipment is' considered
invulnerable to exposures less than 103 and the simulation produced no exposures
Q
greater than 10 .
The expected number of electrical and electronic equipment failures due to CF
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contamination can readily be computed from the probabilities of failure conditional h
on the aircraft external exposure from Chapter 5-0 and the expected number of
aircraft exposed from Table .6-1. For each of the three operational modes, the
expected number of equipment failures can be described by:
'
;X. = M. 7 P. . Y.
T_ 1 ^"^ 1 1 1
-*- -*- • -*-cJ tJ
where:
P.. = the probability of failure for each equipment in group i conditional
on; the aircraft being .exposed to the discrete exposure E. within an
operational mode.
Y. = the expected number of L-1011's exposed to the discrete exposure E.
J
 annually. 3
M. = the quantity of equipments contained in group i per aircraft
therefore:
X. = the expected numbers of equipment failures per year for equipment
group i within an operational mode.
The quantities X^ can be summed over all equipment -groups and-/or over all opera-
tional modes to obtain .the annual expected number of failures by group, by
operational mode,' and the total. The results of these computations for the year
1993 are presented in Table 6-2 which show that the total expected number of
equipment failures is approximately 0.1 due to CF contaimination.
In Appendix A, page A-lU, the annual expected number of failures from current
sources for the 28l pieces of equipment susceptible to CF contamination is 33,^ 75
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TABLE 6-1. EXPECTED NUMBER OF _L-1011 AIRCRAFT EXPOSED TO .
' DISCRETE "CF EXPOSURES" IN 1993V
• OPERATIONAL
MODE
Gate - Day
Gate - Night
Maintenance
DISCRETE JJFJ EXPOSURES - E
FIBER-SECONDS PER CUBIC METER
3.2 x 103
.05^ 55
.00812
.0368U
3.2 x 10^
.06031
.00984
.02133
3.2 x 105
.02700
.00484
.01754
3.2 x 106
.02468 ~"
.00328
.00834
3.2 x 107
.00553
.00090
.00019
TABLE 6-2, EXPECTED NUMBER OF EQUIPMENT FAILURES IN THE
L-1011 FLEET DUE TO CF CONTAMINATION in 1993
EQUIP
GROUP
A .
"B
C
D
E
F
1
 G
H
: TOTAL
QPA
26
24
153
4
65
3
2
4
281
OPERATIONAL MODE
GATE-DAY
.00396
.000614.
. 0040;7
.00011
.00204
.00009
.00006
.00013
. 0111Q
GATE-NIGHT
. 01257
.00010
.00063
.00002
.00738
.00034
. 00023
. .00045
.02172
MAINTENANCE
.04599
.00009
.00059
.00002
. 01985
.00092
. 00061
. 00122
.06929
TOTALS
.06252
.00083
.00529
.00015
.02927
.00135
.00090
.00180
.10211
for a U67 aircraft L-1011 fleet. Therefore CF contamination would only increase
the expected number of failures for these 28l pieces of equipment by 0.0003 per-
cent vhich is negligible.
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'CHAPTER 7 ;__
EXPECTED INCREASE IN MAINTENANCE COSTS DUE TO CF CONTAMINATION
The expected annual maintenance costs due to CF contamination is readily
obtained by combining the expected number of failures with the average cost peri
failure for each of the equipment groups. This is described by:
C. =lc. X.i i l l
where:
c. = the average cost per failure for equipment in group i
X. = the expected number of equipment failures per year for equipment group i
for all operational modes
Therefore:
C. = the expected annual maintenance cost for all equipment in group i.
The quantities C. can be summed for all equipment groups to obtain the total ex-
pected annual costs for the L-1011 fleet. The results of these computations, ob-
tained from the expected number ..of failures from Table 6-2 and the average cost
per failure from Appendix A, Table >A-3, are presented in Table 7-1- These results
for the year 1993 show the total expected annual cost is $25.76 due to electrical
and electronic equipment failures caused by CF contamination.
From Appendix A, Table A-U, the expected annuaf cost for the 281 pieces j
of equipment susceptible to CF contamination is ^ lh,6hj,922 due to current sources
of failure for a U'6'7 aircraft L-1011- fleet . Therefore, GF contaimina-t ion would
only increase the maintenance cost by 0.0002 percent which is negligible.
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TABLE 7-1. EXPECTED ANNUAL COST OF EQUIPMENT FAILURES IN THE L-1011
FLEET DUE TO CF CONTAMINATION FOR 1993
EQUIPMENT
GROUP
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
.. TOTALS
'EXPECTED NUMBER
OF CF FAILURES
IN 1993
.06252
.00083
.00529
.00015
.02927
.00135
.00090
.00180
. 10211
COST PER
FAILURE
(1978 DOLLARS)
216
221
177
2U9
212
530
1297
1665
EXPECTED
! ANNUAL COST
(1978 DOLLARS)
13.50
0.18
0.9^
0.01+
6 .21
0.72
1.17
3.00
25.76
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CHAPTER 8
ASSESSMENT OF HAZARD TO CONTINUED OPERATION
Commercial transport aircraft are designed and certified to extremely severe
criteria for equipment and systems essential to the safe operation. To state this
criteria in the most basic terms:
The aircraft must "be capable of continued safe flight and landing following
any single failure or any combination of failures not shown to be extremely
improbable.
The term "extremely improbable" refers to events so unlikely to occur that they
need not be considered. These' requirements are fulfilled by a variety of design
considerations such as:
• High equipment reliability obtained by the specification of stringent
design and qualification requirements for endurance and protection from
environmental contamination.
• | System design employing component redundancy.
• Alternate means to accomplish required functions.
• Continuous or periodic equipment and system function monitoring.
Systems, whose function is essential to the safe operation of aircraft, usually
incorporate all the above design considerations. It can readily be shown that
aircraft systems designed to the above criteria also provide adequate protection
from CF contamination. The following rationale is offered in substantiation of
this statement.
Since the design criteria for essential systems requires that no single
failure must present a hazard to continued safe operation, it follows that at least
two equipment failures must result from a single CF exposure to cause the system
failure. Consider a hypothetical system configuration consisting of two parallel
channels with three of the most vulnerable equipments in each channel. The loss of
function of a channel is defined as the failure of any one of these pieces of
equipment in that channel and system faiure is defined as loss of function of both
channels. This hypothetical configuration is more vulnerable to CF contamination
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than any essential system on the L-1011. Therefore substantiation that the hazard
to continued aircraft operation based/on the assessment of this hypothetical sys-
tem configuration is a sufficient condition to substantiate that the hazard to the
L-1011 is negligible.
From Tables 5-1 through 5-3, it is obvious that the equipment in Group A is
most vulnerable to CF contamination. Then if all six equipments in the hypotheti-
cal system are in Group A, the conditional probability of system failure can be
described by:
where: . .
P . = the probability of failure for each equipment in Group A conditional
on the aircraft being exposed to the discrete exposure E^ within an
operational mode. (From Tables 5-1 through 5-3.)
Therefore:
l-(l-P ) = the probability of loss of function of one channel caused by
^ the failure of at least one of the three equipments in that
channel conditional on E. within an operational mode.
P. = the probability of system failure caused by loss of function
of both channels conditional on E. within an operational mode.
The expected number of system failures is described by:
Z =
where:
Y. = the expected number of L-1011's exposed to the discrete exposure E.
J
 annually. (From Table 6-1.) J
Therefore:
Z = the expected number of ^failures of the hypothetical system per year
within an operational mode. ~ ""'. ""
Performing the above computation using the data contained in Tables 5-1 through
5-3 and 6-1, the values of Z are 0.00001, 0.000^ 5 and 0.0015*4- for the gate-day,
gate-night and maintenance modes, respectively, or a total of 0.002 expected
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failures of the hypothetical system for the year 1993 in the U6? aircraft L-1011
fleet. This is equivalent to expecting one failure in the fleet every i500 years
which is so unlikely to occur that it need not be considered a hazard to continued
operation. Even if the failure of an essential system would occur, it is very
unlikely that it would present a hazard to continued operation. The integral and
pre-flight monitoring for these systems have a high probability of detecting mal-
functions or failures. Since aircraft are considered potentially vulnerable to CF
contamination only while on the ground, the system malfunction or failure would
be corrected prior to flight. Elimination of flight as a potentially vulnerable
mode is justified by the following considerations:
• Due to the short period of time the aircraft would be immersed in a
concentration, the total external exposure level would be\much lower
than if the aircraft remained in a static ground position.
The only source of 'CF infiltration is through the engines and bleed air
system. The transfer function: for this ingestion path is very low due
to filtering. In addition, NASA studies have shown that the fibers are
too fragile to withstand the high forces associated with passage through
the engine compressor stages. They disintegrate into lengths too short
to cause failures in electrical and electronic equipment.
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' CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
The risk associated with electrical and electronic equipment contamination on
the Lockheed L-1011 due to free carbon/graphite fibers (CF) being released from
fires on commercial transport aircraft incorporating CF composite materials has
been assessed. This assessment is based on projections of the greatly increased
usage of CF composite materials in commercial transport in the next 10-15 years
and a U6T aircraft domestic L-1011 fleet for the year 1993. The major results of
this assessment are:
• The L-1011 contains 28l pieces of electrical and electronic equipment
of 8U different types that susceptible to CF contamination.
• The expected number of equipment .failures due to CF contamination is 0.1
for the L-1011 fleet in 1993- This is only 0.0003 percent of the expected
failures due to current sources of failure for the same 28l pieces of
equipment.
• The expected annual cost due to CF contamination is $25.i?6 for the L-1011
fleet in 1993. This is only 0.0002 percent of the expected annual cost
due to current sources for the same 28l pieces of equipment.
• The risk_to continued aircraft operation due to CF contamination for all
ground and flight operational modes is so unlikely that it need not be
considered.
These results clearly show that the economic and hazard risks associated with CF
contaimination of electrical and electronic equipment are negligible for the
projected usage of CF composite materials on commercial transport aircraft. There-
fore, present design, maintenance, and operational practices provide adequate pro-
tection for this phenomena. .'•:••:: ir;..- . v='i •.••: •< '\"c- in r'•<;•.-••..? ni-^ctico;: "ro:il-.-. u- ,:Y,r
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APPENDIX A
ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
RELIABILITY AND MAINTENANCE COST DATA
INTRODUCTION
This appendix presents current source reliability and maintenance cost data on
the eighty-four L-1011 equipment types identified as susceptible to carbon fiber
(CF) contamination damage in Chapter 2 of this report. These data are used in
Chapters 6 and 7 to establish the cost risk associated with CF contamination and to
provide a basis for assessing the impact of this risk on the maintenance burden
associated with current sources of equipment failure.
EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY/MAINTENANCE COSTS . .
Table A-l summarizes the reliability and maintenance cost data from current
sources. The first five columns reproduced from Tables 2-1 and 2-2 are included
in this table for ease of reference; The next two columns show the basic failure
rate and the unscheduled removal rate for equipment item. These rates are related
by
Unscheduled Removals = Basic (or confirmed) failures
plus
Unconfirmed failures
The failure and removal rates were based primarily on the experience of an
L-1011 customer airline covering the period from-1 May 1978 through 30 April 1979-
Where airline data were not available, estimates were made utilizing MIL-HDBK-217C.
In certain instances, special studies where airlines retrieved data on specific
items were used.
The next column in Table A-l shows the cost per basic failure in 1978 dollars.
This cost is derived in Table A-2. It includes on-aircraft and shop direct labor
material expenditure, and an allowance for burden/overhead costs. The on-aircraft
direct manhours were estimates from Lockheed flight operators maintenance personnel
A-l
"based on their experience in maintaining L-1011 Tristar aircraft. during pre-
delivery flight test operations. The shop direct manhours were primarily obtained
from airline records. For the direct labor cost, ten dollars per hour was used as
the base rate. The burden expenses was 180% of the direct labor cost, which is the
Air Transport Association (ATA) standard used in estimating maintenance costs. The
shop material costs were based on the in-service experience of several airlines,
supplier data, and from existing data on similar equipment.
The cost per unscheduled removal was essentially derived using the information
from the basic failure costs. Material costs on unconfirmed failures are negligible
and therefore ignored. From airline experience, shop direct manhours were, on the
average, 30% less than the basic or confirmed failures. With all else being the
same, the cost per unconfirmed failure was determined. The cost per unscheduled
removal was established by proportioning the costs in accordance with the confirmed
and unconfirmed failure rates.
EQUIPMENT GROUPS
The last column in Table A-l places each equipment in an equipment group.
This reduces the computation burden required for the risk assessment. The criteria
for grouping are that all equipment in a group jhave the same mean exposure-to-
failure (E), be in the same location in the aircraft, and have the same approximate
cost per failure. Eight distinct equipment groups (A through H) were established
and are shown in Table A-3. The average cost per failure in Table A-3 is the
weighted average cost for all equipments in the group.
FAILURES/COST PER YEAR
•Table A-U shows the expected failures, unscheduled removals and costs per
aircraft per year for each equipment group due to current sources of equipment
failure. Directly below the totals, projections of equipment failures and annual
costs for 1993 are shown. • The values in Table A-U are based on 3000 flight hours
per aircraft per year and a projected L-1011 domestic fleet of U67 aircraft for
1993.
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TABLE A-3. SUMMARY TABLE FOE EQUIPMENT GROUPS
EQUIPMENT.
• GROUP
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
QUANTITY
PER
AIRCRAFT
(QPA)
26
2h
153
U
65
3
2 '
U
MEAN EXPOSURE
TO FAILURE
(E)
1.5 x 10T
n
1.0 x 10
n
1.0 x 10
Q
1.0 x 10
1.0 x 108
1,0 x 108
1.0 x 108
1.0 x 108
LOCATION
IN
AIRCRAFT
Avionic Centers
Flight Station
Passenger Cabin
Passenger Cabin
Avionic Centers
Avionic Centers
Avionic Centers
Avionic Centers
AVERAGE
MAINTENANCE
COST PER
FAILURE
(1978 DOLLARS)
216
221
177
2k9
212
530
1297
1665
TABLE A-U. ANNUAL RATES/COSTS - CURRENT SOURCES
EQUIP
: GROUP
! A
B
! C
; D
E
i F
G
H
. TOTALS
QUANTITY
PER
AIRCRAFT
26
2U
153
U
65
3
2
U
281
EXPECTED*
NUMBER
OF BASIC
FAILURES .
PER AIRCRAFT
PER YEAR
lU.2071
13.7925
U.7205
1.7001
3^ .72lU
0.3771*'
O.U61U
1.6998
71.6802
EXPECTED*
NUMBER OF
UNSCHEDULED
REMOVALS
PER AIRCRAFT
PER YEAR
45.^ 350
18.9120
7.^ 760
7.25^ 0
72.300U
.7398
1.151U
2.1003
155.3689
COST PER
UNSCHEDULED
REMOVAL
(1978 DOLLARS)
192
200
171
202
157
Mlk
832
16U6
-
EXPECTED*
UNSCHEDULED
REMOVAL COST :
PER AIRCRAFT
PER YEAR
(1978 DOLLARS)
872ij.
3782
1278
11*65 ;
11351 i
351 i.
958 |
3^57 |
31366 i
'*Based on 3000 Flight hours/Aircraft/Year
. For 1993 - Projected L-1011 Fleet Size = U67 Aircraft
; Expected Number of Equipment Failures = 33,^ 75
; Expected Annual Cost = $1^ ,6^ 7,922
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APPENDIX B
AIRCRAFT POPULATIONS BY HOUR AT
THREE AIRPORTS
APPENDIX B
AIRCRAFT POPULATIONS BY HOUR
AT THREE AIRPORTS
This appendix contains seven tables of aircraft populations at Washington
National, Hartsfield - Atlanta and Miami International Airports. The tables give
the average number of aircraft in each operational mode by hour of day. They are
listed by airport and size category as follows:
B-l - Washington National; small
B-2 - Hartsfield - Atlanta; small
B-3 - Hartsfield - Atlanta; medium
B-U - Hartsfield - Atlanta; large
B-5 - Miami International; small
B-6 - Miami International; medium
B-7 - Miami International; large
The methodology and sources of data for deriving the results contained in
these tables are described in Chapter k.
B-l
TABLE B-l
AIRPORT: Washington National SIZE: Small
HOURLY
PERIOD
0001 - 0100
0101 - :0200
0201 - 0300
0301 - OUOO
0^ 01 - 0500
0501 - 0600
' 0601 - 0700
0701 - 0800
0801 - 0900
0901 - 1000
1001 - 1100
1101 - 1200
1201 - 1300
1301 - lUOO
1^ 01 - 1500
1501 - 1600
1601 - 1700
1701 - 1800
1801 - 1900
1901 - 2000
2001 - 2100
2101 - 2200
2201 - 2300
2301 - 2UOO
Average
Day
 ( 1 )
Average
•Night (2)
Average
AVERAGE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
• GATE
9.00
9.00
9.00
9.00
9.00
9-00
16.00
18.75
13.00
17.50
15.25
16.25
•lU.50
lU.50
16.25
15-50
15.25
16.75
16.75
17.25
17-25
13.25
12.50
9.00
13.73
16.05
9.86
MAINTENANCE
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
' 0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
PARKED
18.00
18.00
18.00
18.00
18.00
18.00
11.00
0.25
0.15
0.00
0.00
0.00
o.oo •
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.25
2.25
6.00
lU.50
18 .-oo
6.6h
0.93
16.17
AIRPORT TOTAL
27.00
. 27.00
•' "27.00
27.00
27.00
27-00
27.00
19.00
13.25
17.50
15.25
16.25
lU.50
lU.50
16.25
15-50
15.25
16.75
16.75
17-50
19.50
19.25
27.00
27.00
•"'• 20.37
16.98
26.03
('!) DAY - 0601-2100; (2) NIGHT - 2101-0600.
B-2
TABLE B-2
AIRPORT: Hartsfield-Atlanta SIZE: Small
HOURLY
PERIOD
0001 - 0100
0101 - 0200
0201 - 0300
0301 - o4oo
0401 - 0500
0501 - 0600
0601 - 0700
0701 - 0800
0801 - 0900
0901 - 1000
1001 - 1100
1101 - 1200
1201 - 1300
1301 - 1*100
1401 - 1500
1501 - 1600
1601 - 1700 '
1701 - 1800
1801 - 1900
1901 - 2000
2001 - 2100
2101 - 2200
2201 - 2300
2301,- 2400
Average
Day
 (1)
Average
.Night
 (2)
Average
AVERAGE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
GATE
42.50 .
23.50
21.75
17-00
6.25
20.00
14.75
4.25
14.50
42.50
32.75
44.25
33-50
23-50
38.25
45.50
24.25
42.25
33.25
42.00
25-50
26.50
29.00
43.00
28.77.
30.73
25-50
MAINTENANCE
16.00
16.00
16.00
16.00
16 . 00
16.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
16.00
16.00
16.00
12.25
10.00
16.00
PARKED
1.00
2.00
4.25
8.75
19.75
16.00
4.75
3.00
3.00
2.75
2.00
2.00
1.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0..00
0.75
2.97
1.25
5.83
AIRPORT TOTAL
59-50
41.50
42.00
41.75
42.00
52 . 00
29.50
17.25
27.50
55'-25
44.75
56.25
44.75
33.50
48.25
55-50
34.25
52.25
43.25
52.00
35.50
42.50.
45.00
59.75
43-99
41.98
47-33
(1) DAY - 0601-2100; (2) NIGHT - 2101-0600.
B-3
TABLE B-3
AIRPORT: Hartsfield-Atlanta SIZE: Medium
HOURLY
PERIOD
0001 - 0100
0101 - 0200
0201 - 0300
0301 - OUOO
oUoi - 0500
0501 - 0600
0601 - 0700
0701 - 0800
0801 - 0900
0901 - 1000
1001 - 1100
1101 - 1200
1201 - 1300
1301 - lUOO
lUOl - 1500
1501 - 1600
1601 - 1700
1701 - 1800
1801 - 1900
1901 - 2000
2001 - 2100
2101 - 2200
2201 - 2300
2301 - 2UOO
Average
Day
 ( 1 }
Average
Night ,2)
Average
AVERAGE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
GATE
2.25
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.25
U.25
3.25
1.00
1.00
1.75
0.50
1.25
2.00
2.50
h.oo
5.75
3.25
3.50
1.00
3.25
3.00
1.00
1.00
2.25
2.17
2.U7
1.67
MAINTENANCE
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
PARKED
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.13
0.20
0.00
AIRPORT TOTAL
3.25
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.25
5-25
U.25
2.00
2.00
2.75
1.50
2.25
3.00
3.50
5.00
6.75
U.25
5-50
3.00
5.25
U.OO
2.00
2.00
3.25
3.29
3.67
2.67
(1) DAY - 0601-2100; (2) NIGHT - 2101-0600.
B-U.
TABLE B-U
AIRPORT: Hartsfield-Atlanta SIZE: Large
HOURLY
PERIOD
0001 - 0100
0101 - 0200
0201 - 0300
0301 - 0400
o4oi - 0500
0501 - 0600
0601 - 0700
0701 - 0800
0801 - 0900
0901 - 1000
1001 - 1100
1101 - 1200
1201 - 1300
1301 - 1400
i4oi - 1500
1501 - 1600
1601 - 1700
1701 - 1800
1801 - 1900
1901 - 2000
2001 - 2100
2101 - 2200
2201 - 2300
2301 - 2400
Average
Day / N
> (.-L )Average
Night £2j
Average
AVERAGE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
GATE
7-50
3.00
. 3.50
3.75
4.75
6.75
4.25
2.00
2.00
7-50
5-25
4.00
2.00
1.50
3.25
5-50
4.00
6.25
2.50
8.50
3.00
0.75
0.50
4.25
4.01
4.10
3.86
MAINTENANCE
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00 '
2.00
2.00
. 2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
2.38
2.00
3.00
PARKED
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
AIRPORT TOTAL
10.50
6.00
6.50
6.75
7.75 '
9.75
6.25
4.oo
4.oo
9.50
7.25
6.00
4-.00-
3.50
5.25
7.50
6.00
8.25
4.50
10.50
5.00
3.75
3.50
7.25
6.39
6.10
6.86
(l) DAY - 0601-2100; (2) WIGHT - 2101 - 0600.
B-5
TABLE B-5
AIRPORT: Miami International SIZE: Small
HOURLY
PERIOD
0001 - 0100
0101 - 0200
0201 - Q300
0301 - OUOQ
oUoi - 0500
0501 - 0600
06bl - 0700
0701 - 0800
0801 - 0900
0901 - 1000
1001 - 1100
1101 - 1200
1201 - 1300
1301 - lUOO
1U01 - 1500
1501 - 1600
1601 - 1700
1701 - 1800
1801 - 1900
1901 - 2000
2001 - 2100
2101 - 2200
2201 - 2300
2301 - 2UOO
Average
Day
 (1)Average
Night
 (2)
Average
AVERAGE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
GATE
U2.50
36.75
1*1.25
36.25
29.00
17.50
16.75
15.25
8.75
9.00
6.50
22.50
32.50
25-75
27-50
26.25
27.50
16.75
•16.25
16.00
18.25
27-25
17-50
19.75
23.05
19.03
29.75
MAINTENANCE
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
8.00
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
U.OO
8.00
8.00
8.00
5-50
U.OO
8.00
PARKED
U.25
9-25 .
12.00
17-00
23.75
36.00
33.25
21.75
11.00
U.50
U.OO
1.50
0.75
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.25
2.00
2.00
2.50
7.93
5.U3
12.08
AIRPORT TOTAL
5U.75
5U.OO
61.25
61.25
60.75
61.50
5U.OO
Ul.OO
23.75
17.50
lU.50
28.00
37.25
29.75
31.50
30.25
32 . 00
21.75
21.25
21.00
23.50
37.25
27-50
30.25
36. U8
28. U6
U9.83
(1) DAY - 0601-2100; (2) NIGHT - 2101-0600.
B-6
TABLE B-6
AIRPORT: Miami International SIZE: Medium
HOURLY
PERIOD
0001 .- 0100
0101 - 0200
0201 - 0300
0301 - OUOO
oUoi - 0500
0501 - 0600
0601 - 07 00
0701 - 0800
0801 - 0900
0901 - 1000
1001 - 1100
1101 - 1200
1201 - 1300
1301 - lUOO.
1U01 - 1500
1501 - 1600
1601 - 1700
1701 - 1800
1801 - 1900
1901 - 2000
2001 - 2100
2101 - 2200
2201 - 2300
2301 - 2*tOO
Average
Day
 (1)
Average
Night
 (2)
Average •
AVERAGE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
GATE
2.00
U.50
5.75
5.25
3.75
3.75
2.75
2.00
2.75
1.00
1.50
3.00
3.50
1.50
2.00
3.50
6.00
U. 50
1.25
1.25
2.50
3.00
1.00
1.00
2.28
2.60
3.33
MAINTENANCE
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
0.75
0.00
2.00
PARKED
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00 .
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
AIRPORT TOTAL
U.OO
6.50
7.75
7.25
5.75
5-75
2.75
2.00
2.75
1.00
1.50
3.00
3.50
1.50
2.00
3.50
6.00
1*.50
1.25
1.25
2.50
5.00
3.00
3.00
3.63
2.60
5.33
(1) DAY - 1601-2100; (2) NIGHT - 2101-0600.
B-7
TABLE B-7
AIRPORT: Miami International SIZE: Large
HOURLY
PERIOD
0001 - 0100
0101 - 0200
0201 - 0300
0301 - QitOO
oUoi - 0500
0501 - 0600
0601 - 0700
OT01 - 0800
0801 - 0900
0901 - 1000
1001 - 1100
1101 - 1200
1201 - 1300
1301 - lUOO
lUOl - 1500
1501 - 1600
1601 - 1700
1701 - 1800
'1801 - 1900
1901 - 2000
2001 - 2100
2101 - 2200
' 2201 - 2300
2301 - 2UOO
Average
Day
 (1)
Average
Wight ,2.
Average
AVERAGE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
GATE
7.50
8.75.
7.00
8.00
i*. 75
1.50
it. 25
5.25
8.25
.^ 75
5.25
6.25
10.00
9.25
2.25
5.25'
12.50
8.00
2.50
2.75
1.25
1.75
2.75
it. 00
5.59
5.88
5.11
MAINTENANCE
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
. 3.00
3.00
3-00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
it. 13
3.00
6.00
PARKED
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.50
It. 00
6.50
5-50
it. 00
2.00
1.50
0.75
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.11
0.92
l.itit
AIRPORT TOTAL
13.50
lit. 75
lit. 00
15-50
lit. 75
lit. 00
12.75
12.25
13.25
9.25
9.50
9.25
13.00
12.25
5.25
8.25
15.50
11.00
5-50
5.75
it. 25
7.75
8.75
10.00
10.83
9.80
12.55
(1) DAY - 0601-2100; (2) NIGHT - 2101-0600.
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PROBABILITIES OF EXPOSURE OF JET
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Joseph Fiksel, Mark Pendrock,
and Donald B. Rosenfield
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Cambridge, Ma.
WORKING MEMORANDUM No. 3 CASE: ,81857-04 DATE: 11 SEPTEMBER 1979 PAGE: 1
PROBABILITIES OF EXPOSURE OF JET AIRCRAFT AT MAJOR U.S. AIRPORTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize an analysis performed of
potential carbon fiber exposures at major U.S. airports. The results of
this analysis will be utilized in conjunction with a safety analysis and
a risk analysis of electronic components within U.S. aircraft. The analy-
sis was performed by Monte Carlo simulation using Arthur D. Little's
carbon fiber dispersion and risk analysis model.
The major finding of the analysis is that probabilities of exposure that
can reasonably affect the electronic systems of U.S. jet aircraft are
extremely small. The probability of a fire accident resulting in an
exposure of 103 fs/m3 at either the gate or maintenance area of a major
airport is 2.2% per accident. The corresponding probabilities of exposures in
excess of 10\ 105, 106, and 107 are 1.4%, .7%, .3%, and .04% respectively.
The probabilities of these exposures affecting given numbers of aircraft,
and breakdowns by day and night and by maintenance and gate areas are
presented in Section III.
The conclusions were based on certain assumptions and simplifications.
The major assumption was that all of the aircraft in either the gate or
maintenance area would experience the identical exposure in any fire
accident. Another way of looking at this is that we assumed that air-
craft were for the purposes of the model located at the same point. Ex-
posure probabilities were computed analyzing exposures at one mainten-
ance point and two gate points. A second major assumption was that at
any given point during the day or night the number of aircraft on the
ground would be equal to the average for the day or night period. Thus,
the probabilities were computed by determining exposure .probabilities at
given locations and then assuming that all the aircraft in the gate or
maintenance area were located at these locations. These assumptions
lower the probability of any aircraft experiencing a given exposure but
increase the probability that all planes experience the given exposure.
Arthur O Little. Inc
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It was also assumed within the context of the ADL dispersion model that
the direction and velocity of the wind would not change in the course
of the dispersion. This assumption has the practical affect of causing
a thin cloud to disperse in a given direction without any variation or
changes in direction. In actuality, a fire or explosion on or near the
airport may be subject to some variation in speed and direction. However,
even allowing for error due to these assumptions, it is clear that signifi-
cant exposures at airport locations are highly unlikely.
There are two major reasons why the exposure probabilities at airport
locations are extremely small. First, under the most likely set of
release conditions a plume release does not result in substantial exposures
at locations close to the source of the plume. Cases analyzed by Arthur
D. Little previously show that distance to the beginning of the 103 con-
tour is usually several thousand meters. If, as in the case of most
aircraft accidents, the location of the fire is close to the airport then
the plume cloud will not result in high exposures at the airport. The
second reason is that even in the case of an explosive release, the width
of the cloud is quite narrow at locations close to the source of the
accident. Thus, it is very unlikely that an explosive release will af-
fect a particular location. This event will only occur if the wind di-
rection is precisely in the direction of that location. Our model simpli-
fies the true situation by locating all of the aircraft at a small num-
ber of points. Actual probabilities of any aircraft being covered by a
given exposure might be higher than estimated. To compensate for this,
we assume that all the aircraft are exposed if any are.
The results presented in this memorandum are aggregated over all sizes of
aircraft because there is a great deal of correlation in the exposure
probabilities for small, medium and large aircraft. It is not very
meaningful to present probabilities of exposure for small, medium, and
large aircraft taken separately.
II. METHODOLOGY
The analysis was performed in the following steps:
t For each of 9 major airports we computer coded the
location of the maintenance area and two central gate points
• We executed the Arthur D. Little carbon fiber dispersion
and risk analysis model to compute the probability of
exposure at various levels at the particular locations.
t For each airport, we evaluated the probability of a given
number of aircraft being exposed during the day and night
operations by assuming that the average number of planes
on the ground are all located at a single point representa-
tive of the sample points used in the program.
Art hurl) Little, Inc
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• We computed the national probability of exposure for a
given number of planes by mixing the individual airport
probabilities according to the number of estimated opera-
tions of aircraft carrying carbon fibers. As noted, the
assumption that all of the aircraft are located at a given
point overestimates the probability that any plane will be
covered by a given exposure. On the other hand, it under-
estimates the probability that all of either the gate or
maintenance aircraft can experience a given exposure.
The gate and maintenance area coordinates were determined from airport
maps and were computed in relation to the centroid of the airports run-
ways. The precise distances were extremely important in the analysis
and hence the assumptions of accident locations in the risk analysis
model should be reviewed. For each airport, a probability distribution
for the given runway was input and accidents taking place off the runway
were located according to a model based on historical data. Takeoff
and landing accidents taking place on or near the airport were assumed
to take place at the center of the appropriate runway. Static and taxi
accidents were assumed to take place near the gate area and were there-
fore located between the two gate locations utilized for exposure sam-
pling.
The dispersion model is the modified model being utilized by Arthur D.
Little in its national risk assessment being performed for NASA. This
model is the same as the model presented in a previous report except for
the following modifications:
• Time of burn, percent of fuel burned and percent of carbon
fiber structures consumed are based on a probabilistic dis-
tribution constructed from a data base of 92 fire and ex-
plosion accidents compiled by Lockheed, Douglas, and Boeing.
Correlations among these variables were implemented and the
distribution for percent of carbon fiber structures consumed
is consistent with a structural damage model developed by
Lockheed.
t Carbon fiber usage on aircraft is consistent with the pro-
duction forecasts up to an including 1993 by the three airframe
manufacturers. Fleets of aircraft that use carbon fibers
are assumed to be split equally among the airframe manufacturers
appropriate for each size of aircraft.
• Maximum percentage of carbon fibers released is assumed to be
1% and 4% for plume and explosive releases respectively.
• Maximum fuel loads are consistent with the types of aircraft
that are dominating the 1993 fleet mix.
Arthur I) Little. Inc
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• Probability of explosive release is conservatively estimated
to be 15%. This is consistent with the 92 fire and explosion
accidents compiled by Lockheed, Douglas, and Boeing. This
estimate is conservative in a sense that not all of these
explosions represent burns followed by an explosion. The
probability of an explosive release is higher than 15% for
take-off accidents taking place on or near the runway and
slightly lower than 15% for landing accidents.
In the next step of the analysis, probability distributions were estimated .
using the model for each of the nine airports at the maintenance and the gate
areas conditional on there being a fire accident. These conditional dis-
tributions are presented in Table 1.
In the next step of the analysis the conditional_distributions represented
in Table 1 were combined with the statistics of the number of planes at
each airport during the day and night in the gate and maintenance area to
produce a distribution of number of planes being exposed to a given ex-
posure.
In the final step of the analysis we assumed that every fire accident will
occur at one of the nine airports. By making this assumption we can use
the nine airports to project a national risk profile. In order to perform
the final step, it was necessary to compute the conditional probability
that an accident occurred at a particular one of these nine airports given
that it occurred at one of the nine airports. The equation utilized in
computing these probabilities is
Prob C. is proportional to(estimated 1993 operations) x
(weather factor) x (percent CF)
Derivation of the weather factor and the estimated 1993 operation are
presented in the Arthur D. Little report for Phase 1. The percentage
of CF represents the percentage of operations at a given airport in 1993
that will involve aircraft utilizing CF. These percentages were estimated
utilizing the airframer estimates for percent of 1993 fleets carrying
CF and projections of operations mixes by aircraft type at each given
airport. Factors utilized in the computation and the conditional prob-
ability of each major city are presented in Table 2.
To estimate the conditional probability that an accident occurs during
the day and night operations, we examined operations statistics at three
airports and accident times for the 92 accidents cited previously. For
Boston, the percentage of operations taking place during the night hours
is 6% and for Washington, D.C. and Atlanta the percentages are 3.5% and
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22% respectively. The percentage of night accidents in the data base
is 25%. (These were the only data available). We, therefore, equate
the nighttime probability of an accident at Washington to be 3.5% x the
probability of an accident. For Boston* and for other cities that we
judged to be mainly daytime airports we estimated the probability of an
accident occurring during the nighttime hours as 6% x the probability of
an accident. These cities included Boston, LaGuardia, Philadelphia, and
St. Louis. For the other airports, Atlanta, Chicago, Kennedy, and Miami,
which we judged to be active 24 hour airports we estimated that the
probability of an accident taking place during the night hours is 25%
x the probability of an accident. This estimate is consistent with the
statistics from the 92-accident data base and the operations data from
Atlanta. We used the 25% figure rather than 22% since there seems to be
some evidence that night operations involve slightly more risk.
The conditional probability that an accident takes place at a given air-
port along with the day-night probabilities were utilized in constructing
the overall distributions. These are presented in the next section.
III. RESULTS
The aggregate distributions for the number of aircraft experiencing a
given exposure value are presented in Table 3 through 6. These tables
represent the four conditions of interest which are day and night for gate
and maintenance. Tables 7 through 10 present the aggregated and main-
tenance distributions and Table 11 represents the overall distributions.
As noted previously, the conditional probability of aircraft being exposed
to moderate exposure values is very low.
To convert these probabilities to annual values, each of the probabilities
should be multiplied by 3.2 to represent the number of accidents occurring
in a year. Thus, for example, the conditional probability of 10 or more
planes being exposed to an exposure of 105 or greater is .69%. The annual
probability of exposing 10 planes or greater to 105 or greater exposure
is 3.2 x .69% or 2.2%. Table 12 through 20 are the analog of Tables 3
through 11 on an annual basis.
In order to estimate the size of the aircraft involved Table 21 presents
the average fleet mix for aircraft exposed for each of the different
situations.
Table 22 presents summaries of Tables 12 through 20 by presenting the
average number of planes experiencing exposures in each interval for
the various cases. The logarithmic average was chosen as the exposure
value for each interval.
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TABLE 1
CONDITIONAL EXPOSURE DISTRIBUTIONS AT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREAS FOR NINE AIRPORTS
Airport: JFK
Exposure (fs/m )
10
10"
10'
Probability That Maintenance Probability that Gate
Exposure Exceeds Value Exposure Exceeds Value
.014
. 008
.004
.0015
0
.0125
.0080
.0030
.0015
0
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONAL EXPOSURE DISTRIBUTIONS AT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREAS FOR NINE AIRPORTS
Airport: Chicago
Exposure (fs/m )
103
104
105
106
107
Probability That Maintenance
Exposure Exceeds Value
.0165
.0085.
.0040
.0005
Probability that Gate
Exposure Exceeds Value
.0105
. 0080
.0045
.0030
.005
Arthur D Little Inc.
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONAL EXPOSURE DISTRIBUTIONS AT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREAS FOR NINE AIRPORTS
Airport: Miami
Exposure (fs/m )
103
104
. io5
106
IO7
Probability That Maintenance
Exposure Exceeds Value
.022
.0115
.005
.0025
.0005
Probability That Gate
Exposure Exceeds Value
.0118
.0063
.0033
.0008
.0003
Arthur D I.ittlelnc
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONAL EXPOSURE DISTRIBUTIONS AT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREAS FOR NINE AIRPORTS
Airport: Atlanta
Exposure (fs/m )
,^3
10
10£
10'
4
Probability That Maintenance Probability That Gate
Exposure Exceeds Value Exposure Exceeds Value
.016
.0105
.007
.003
.0118
.0078
.0033
.0008
.0003
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONAL EXPOSURE DISTRIBUTIONS AT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREAS FOR NINE AIRPORTS
Airport: LaGuardia
Probability That Maintenance Probability That Gate
Exposure (fs/m ) Exposure Exceeds Value Exposure Exceeds Value
103 .0075 .0103
104 .0045 .0073
105 .0030 .0048
106 .0015 .0023
107 ' .0008
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONAL EXPOSURE DISTRIBUTIONS AT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREAS FOR NINE AIRPORTS
Airport: DC National
_ Probability That Maintenance Probability That Gate
Exposure (fs/m ) Exposure Exceeds Value Exposure Exceeds Va/lue
103 .017 .014
104 .011 .0095
105 .010 .0070
106 .0055 .0040
107 .0005
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONAL EXPOSURE DISTRIBUTIONS AT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREAS FOR NINE AIRPORTS
Airport: Boston
Exposure (fs/m )
O
I O
io5
io6
io7
Probability That Maintenance Probability That Gate
Exposure Exceeds Value Exposure Exceeds Value
.006
.004
.002
.0009
.0006
.0005
.0001
.000025
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONAL EXPOSURE DISTRIBUTIONS AT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREAS FOR NINE AIRPORTS
Airport: Philadelphia
Probability That Maintenance Probability That Gate
Exposure (fs/nr) . Exposure Exceeds Value Exposure Exceeds Value
TO3 .0165 .0105
104 .0090 .0065
105 .0035 .0060
106 .0005 .0030
107 .0010
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
CONDITIONAL EXPOSURE DISTRIBUTIONS AT GATE AND MAINTENANCE
AREAS FOR NINE AIRPORTS
Airport: St. Louis
_ Probability That Maintenance Probability That Gate
Exposure (fs/m ) Exposure Exceeds Value Exposure Exceeds Value
103 .0105 .0075
104 .008 .0045
105 .0055 .0015
106 .0015 .0005
107
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TABLE 4
PROBABILITY CONDITIONAL ON AN ACCIDENT THAT n OR MORE
PLANES ARE EXPOSED TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Gate Night
o
Exposure E (fs/nr)
10 10 10'
Number of
Planes n
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.00203U
.00203U
.00203*.
.00201*
.001° 8*
.001981
.OCi'95*
.001954
.00.1904
.00140*
.001400
.001*00
.001*00
.001*00
.000700
.000700
.000700
.000200
.000200
.000000
.000000
.001*2o.
.001*26
.001*76
.001*12
.Q01"a2
.001392
.001372
.001372
.0013.32
.001032
.001030
.001030
.001030
.001030
.000*30
.000430
.000*30
.000130
.000130
.000000
.000000
. OOGbHl
.000681
.OOOobi
.000676
. C00oo2
.0006o2
.000642
.000b*2
.000o22
.000502
.000500
.000500
.000500
.000500
.000200
.000200
.000200
.000070
.000070
.000000
.000000
.000337
.0003^ 7
.000^37
.000335
.000327
.000327
.000318
.000318
.000306
,0002*b
.0002*6
.0002*6
.0002*6
.0002*o
.0000*6
.000.0*6
.0000*6
.000016
.OOOOlo
.000000
.000000
.000065
.C000b5
.OOOCo5
.OCOOo5
.0000o5
.OOOOoS
.0000o2
.000062
.OOOOco
.000056
. 00005 H
,oooo:«
.000058
.00003d
.000018
.000018
iCOOClB
.OOOOCo
.000006
- . oooooo
.oooocc
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TABLE 5
PROBABILITY CONDITIONAL ON AN ACCIDENT THAT n OR MORE
PLANES ARE EXPOSED TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Maintenance Day
Exposure E (fs/m )
10C 10'
Number of
Planes n
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.009100
.008200
.008200
.00o900
.005°.00
.001900
.001900
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.005160
.00^ 500
.00500
.ccn°oo
.00? 000
.001200
.001200
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.002^ 00
.002400
.002^ 00
.002100
.OOloOO
.000800
.000800
.000000
.•000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000920
.000630
.000850
.000700
.000500
.000*00
.000^ 00
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.0000^ 0
.0000^ 0
.000030
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000-
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
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TABLE 6
PROBABILITY CONDITIONAL ON AN ACCIDENT THAT n OR MORE
PLANES ARE EXPOSED TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Maintenance Night
Number of
Planes n
Exposure E (fs/m3)
'1 n*3 10C
2
4
•7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.002870
.002870
.002840
.0028*40
.002840
.0028^ 0
.0028^ 0
.0028^ 0
.002340
.002340
.002340
.0023^ 0
.0017^ 0
.001700
.001700
.000500
.000500
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.0016^ 0
.0016^ 0
.001620
.001620
.001620
.001620
.001620
.001620
.001320
.001320
.001320
.001320
.000920
.000900
.000900
.000300
.000300
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000915
.000915
.000895
.000895
.000895
.000895
.000895
.000895
.000785
.000785
.000785
.000785
.000485
.000^ 70
.000470
.000170
.000170
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000283
.000283
.000278
.000278
.000278
.000278
.000278
.000278.
.000228
.000228
.000228
.000228
.000108
.000100
.000100
.000060
.000060
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000010
.000010
.000010
.000010
.000010
.000010
.000010
.000010
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
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TABLE 7
PROBABILITY CONDITIONAL ON AN ACCIDENT THAT n OR MORE
PLANES ARE EXPOSED TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Day
Number of
Planes n
Q
Exposure E (fs/m )
2
4 •
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
Q
1 ft
.017bCO
.016700
.Olb700
.015UOO
,01°200
.009800
.OCQ800
.007900
.007900
.007000
.OCbbOO
'.005800
.005800
.005800
.005800
.005800
.005100
.005100
.gc°7oo
.003700
.001500
4
.01GQ20
.0102bO
,C102bO
,OO u obO
,OOo3bO
.OOb3-uO
,OCo5oC
,C053bO
,0053bO
.OO u 7bO
.00^500
.003QOC
.003900
.003QOC
.003900
.003900
.003500
.003 500
,002oOO
.002600
.000900
c
T ft
..005800
.OQ5tK)0
.CG5"00'
.005 100
,00U U-00
.00?bOO
.C03bOO
.002800
.002800
.002300
.002200
.001800
.001800
.001800
.001800
. O O l d O O
.001 bOO
. O'Jl bOO
.001200
.001200
.000300
106
.002370
.002300
.002300
.00215.0
.001850
.001750
• .001750
.001350
.001350
..001150
.001120
.000920
.000°20
.000920
.000920
.OC092C
.000870
.000870
.000770
.000770
.000170
107
.0003U2
.0003U?
.000.3it2
.000312
.QGC2b2
.OCC2o2.
.000262
,0002b2
.000262
.000232
.000230
.000170
.000170
.000170
.000170
.000170
.000150
.000150
.000110
.000110
.000000
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TABLE 8
PROBABILITY CONDITIONAL ON AN ACCIDENT THAT n OR MORE
PLANES ARE EXPOSED TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Night
Exposure E (fs/m )
10'
Number of
Planes n
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.004904
.00^904
.004874
.00*854
.004824
.004824
.004794
.004794
.00*244
.00374U
.003740
.003740
.0031UQ
.003100
.002400
.001200
.001200
.000200
.000200
.000000
.000000
.003066
.003066
.003046
.003032
.003012
.003012
.002992
.002992
.002652
.002352
.002350
.002350
.001950
.001930
.001330
.000730
.000730
.000130
.000130
.000000
.000000
.001596
.001596
.001576
.001571
.001557
.001557
.001537
.001537
.001*07
.001287
.001285
.001285
.000985
.000970
.000670
.0.00370
.000370
.000070
.000070
.000000
.000000
.000620
.000620
.000615
.000613
.000605
.000605
.000596
.000596
.000534
.OOOU7U
.0004?u
.OOOU7U.
.000354
.000346
.0001^6
.000106
.000106
.000016
.000016
.000000
.000000
.000075
.000075
.000075
.000075
.000075
.000075
.000072
.000072
.000058
.000058
.000058
.000058
.000058
.000058
.000018
.000018
.000018
.000006
.000006
. 000000
.000000
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TABLE 9
PROBABILITY CONDITIONAL ON AN ACCIDENT THAT n OR MORE
PLANES ARE EXPOSED TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Gate
Exposure E (fs/m )
Number of
Planes n
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
10°
.01053"
.01053"
.0105^ "
.01051"
10
.00988"
.00985"
.009854.
.00980"
.008UO"
.008000
.007200
.007200
.007200
.OCoSOO
.006500
.C05800
.005300
.003900
.003700
.001500
.007l8b
,00718b
.007172
.006752
.00b752
.00b732
.006732
.00bu92
.005792
.005530
.00"930
.OC"930
.00^ 330
.003630
.002730
.002600
..0009 GO
105
.003681
.0.03681
.003681
.Q03670
.OC3"62
. C03"62
,QQ?.uu2
.003U"2
.C03U22
.002802
.002700
.002300
.002300
.0023QO
.002 COO
.002000
.001800
.001o70
.001270
.001200
.000300
106
.0017H7
.001787
.0017b7
.001785
.C01o77
.001677
.00l6b8
,C016b8
.001656
.001396
.001366
.001106
,00116b
.001160
.000966
. 000966
.000916
.000886
.000786
.000770.
.000170
107
.000377
.000^77
.000377
.000377
.000327
.000327
.00032"
.00032"
.000320
.0002Q0
.000288
.000228
.000228
.000228
.000188
.0001*8
.000108
.OOOlSo
.OOOllb
.000110
.000000
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TABLE 10
PROBABILITY CONDITIONAL ON AN ACCIDENT THAT n OR MORE
PLANES ARE EXPOSED TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Maintenance
Exposure E (fs/m )
10C 10'
Number of
Planes n
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.011970
.011070
.0110UO
.009710
.0081"0
.00^ 740
.004740
.002840
.002340
.0023^ 0
.002340
.002340
.0017^ 0
.001700
.001700
.000500
.000500
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.006800
.006140
.006120
.005520
.004620
.002820
.002820
.001620
.001320
.001320
.001320
.001320
.000920
.000900
.000900
.000300
.000300
. .000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.003715
.003315
.003295
.002995
.002^ 95
.001695
.001695
.000895
.000785
.000785
.000785
.000785
.000485
.000470
.000470
.000170
.000170
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
..001203
.001133
.001128
.000978
.000778
.000678
.000678
.000278
.000228
..000228
.000228
.000228
.000108
.000100
.000100
.000060
.000060
' .000000
.000000
. .000000
.000000'
.000040
.000040
.000040
.000010
.000010
.000010
.000010
.000010
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000-
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TABLE 11
PROBABILITY CONDITIONAL ON AN ACCIDENT THAT n OR MORE
PLANES ARE EXPOSED TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Overall
Number of
Planes n
Exposure E (fs/m^)
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
. 103
.022*00
.021500
.021*70
.020170
.017070
.01*570
.01*5*0
.0126*0
.0121*0
.0107ac
.0103*0
.0095*0
.0069*0
.008900
.008200
.007000
.006300
.005300
.003900
.003700
. 0 01 500
104
.01*010
.013350
.01333C
.012o3C
.01133Q
.00° 530
.00^510
.008310
..008010
.007110
.CC6H50
.006250
.005850
.005830
..005230
.00*6^0
.00*230 .
.003630
.002730
.002600
.OGQ 0 <JO
105
.007355
.0 Ob 95 5
.00b9'a 5
.()0bu35
.005a?5
.005135
.005115
.00*315
.00*185
.003585
.003*85
.003085
.002785
.002770
.002*70
.002170
. .001970
.001670
.001270
.001200
.000*00-
106
.003018
.0029*8
. 002U*3
.002793
.002*93
.002393
.002384
.00198*
.001924
.00162*
.00159*
.OC130U
.00127*
.0012o6
. C O l O b b
,00102o
.000976
. C O O t f t f b
.000786
.000770
.000170
107
.000*17
.000*17
. .000*17
.0003^7
.0003^7
.000337
.00033"
.00033*
.000°20
.000290
.00028n
.00022»
.0002 2*
.000228
.00018*
.000188
.COClo8
.000156
.OOOllo
.000110
.000000
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TABLE 12
ANNUAL PROBABILITY THAT n OR MORE PLANES ARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Gate Day
Number of
Planes n
•3
Exposure E (fs/m )
104 10C 107
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.027200
.027200
.027200
.027200
.025780
.025280
.0232*0
.025280
.025280
.022*00
.021120
.01*560
.018560
.018560
.018560
.018560
.016320
.Olo320
.0118*0
.0118*0
.00*800
.018*32
.018*32
.018*32
.01 8*^2
.017152
.017152
.017152
.017152
.017152
.015232
.QluuQO
.012*80
.012*80
.012 "80
.012*80
.012*80
.011200
.011200
.008320
.008320
.002880
.0-09bOO
.C09oOO
. C 096 00
.009bOO
.008U60
.008QoO
. 00*9bO
.008ubO
.0089bO
.007 3 bO
.0070^0 .
.005760
.005760
.0057bO
.005760
.0057D0
.005120
.005120
.0038^0
.0038^0
.000960
.00^6^0
.CO^b^O
.00"6UO
. OO^oUO
.00^320
.00^^20
.00^-^20
.00"320
.00^320
.003t>«0
.00358^
.002"H^
.0029UU
.0029^
.0029uu
.0029"-^
.00278^
.00278^
.002^6^
.002^bii
.000544
.000998
.0009^8
. O C O a Q H
.000Q Q6
.'"00838
.OCU83«
.000838
.000838
.00083«
.000742
.000736
.OQQSaa
.0005^
.0005^-4
.0005^*
.0005^"-
.000^80
.000*80
.000352
.000352
.000000
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TABLE 13
ANNUAL PROBABILITY THAT n OR MORE PLANES ARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Gate Night
Exposure E (fs/m3)
10C 10'
Number of
Planes n
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.OOo59Q
.006509.
.00o509
.00b"^3
.00o3uu
.00b3uo
.C0b253
.00b253
.OOuCQ3
,00ulia3
.OQua^O
.004^80
.00^480
.00^^-80 '
.0022^0
.0022^0
.0022"0
.0006.^0
.OOOo^O
.000000
.000000
,00"5u3
,00u5o^
.OO^SoS
.CO" 318
,00Uu3ii
,OO t lU:J i l
,00u?oo
.00^^90
.00^262
.003302
.OC/Q29b
.0032.^6
.OC32uo
.0032°b
.001376
.00137o
.001376
.OOQ^lo
.OOOUlb
.000000
.000000
.002 17 u
.002179
. 0 17 1 7 Q
.0021b?
.oonih
.002118
.0020"-^
.00205.^
.001U90
.OOlbOo
.001 bOO
.OOlbOC)
. O O l b O O
.OOloOO
.0006^0
.0006^0
. 000 o^O
.00022^
.00022^
.000000
.000000
.0010HO
.001080
.001080
.001073
.0010 ^b.
.0010^8
.001019
.001019
.000°«0
.0007^6
.C007B7
.000787
.0007«7
.000787
.0001^7
.ooom?
.000147
.000051
.000051
.000000
.000000
.00020°
.000209
.000209
.000709
.00020*
. .000208
.OOC1QQ
.0001° 9
.000186
.000185
.0001*6
.OOOlHb
.000180
.000186
.000058
.00005K
.000058
.000019
.00001^
.000000
.000000
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TABLE 14
ANNUAL PROBABILITY THAT n OR MORE PLANES ARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Maintenance Day
Number of
Planes n
o
Exposure (fs/m )
10C 10'
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.02Q120
.0262*0
. .0262*0
.0220KO
.016900
.OOoOHO
.OOoOHO
'.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.ooocoo
'.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
'.000000
.000000
'.000000
.000000
.Olo512
.01**00
,01**00
.012*80
.00^ 600
. 00^ *0
.OC?r!*0
.ooocoo
.ooocoo
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.ooooco
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.OOtf9oO
.007680
.007 6oO
.006720
.005120
.0025bO
.002?oO
.OOOOCO
.000000
.000000
..000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
-.000000
.0029**
.002720
.002720
.0022*0
.001600
.001280
.001280
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
..000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.
:oocooo
.000000
.000000
.000096
.000096
.0000ab
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.ooocoo
.000000
.000000
. 000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
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TABLE 15
ANNUAL PROBABILITY THAT n OR MORE PLANES ARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Maintenance Night
Exposure E (fs/m3)
10* 10' 10'
Number of
Planes n
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.009184
.00918^
.009088
.009088
.009088
.009088
.009088
.009088
.007^ 88
.007488
.007488
.007488
.005568
.00544Q
.005440
.001600
.001600
. 000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.005248
.005248
.005184
.005184
.005184
.005184
.005184
.005184
.004224
.004224
.004224
.004224
.002944
.002880
.002880
.000960
.000960
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.002928
.002928
.002864
.002864
.002864
.002864
.002864
.002864
.002512
.002512
.002512
.002512
.001552
.001504
.001504
.000544
.000544
. 000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000906
.000906
.000890
.000890
.000890
.000890
.000890
.000890
.000730
.000730
.000730
.000730
.000346
.000320
.000320
.000192
.000192
. 000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000032
.000032
.00003.2
.000032
.000032
.000032
.000032
.000032
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
iOOOOOO
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
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TABLE 16
ANNUAL PROBABILITY THAT n OR MORE PLANES ARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Day
Exposure E (fs/m3)
10V 10' 10'
Number of
Planes n
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.05b?20
.CSaauo
.053^0
.0^9280
.0^22^0
.031360
.0313bO
.0.252HO
.025230
.022^00
.021120
.0185oO
-.018560
.016560
.018560
.018560
.016320
.016320
.011840
.0118^0
.004*00
.03uuuu
.O0?;-:0.?
.032o32
.03QQ12
• ,02o"52
.C'20Q92
.020 r j l J2
.017152
.017152
.013232
.01^00
.012^80
.012^80
.012^60
.012^80
.012^80
.011200
.011200
,008°20
.008° 20
.002H80
.oi«:-oO
.0172.nO
.017280
.Olo?20
.01^080
.011320
.011520
.0089oO
.008%0
.007?bC
.0070^0
.005760
.OC37oC
.005760
.005760
.003760
.005120
.005120
.0038"0
.003BUQ
.'000<JoO
.00758^
.O07.?o0
.0073bO
.006880
.003Q20
. O O S b O O
.OOSbOO
.004-320
.00^320
,003b80
.00358U
. 002QU-ti
.0029^4
. .00294U
.002 9" ii
'. 002 944
.00278^
.0027yu
.002u0a
.002164
.OQQ5LLU
.0010°^
.001094
.00109"
.000990
.000838
.000838
.000838
.000836
.000638
.0007u2
.0007^6
.OOOSuu
.OQ03HU
,.0005iiu
.0003^"
.0005^u
.000^80
.000480
.000352
. 000^32
.000000
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TABLE 17
ANNUAL PROBABILITY THAT n OR MORE PLANES ARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Night
Exposure E (fs/m3)
10C 10'
Number of
Planes n
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.015693
.015693
.015597
.015533
.015*37
.015*37
.0153*1
.0153*1
.013581
.011981
.011968
.011968
.0100*8
.009920
.007680
.0038*0
.0038*0
.0006*0
.0006*0
.000000
.000000
.009811
.009811
.0097*7
.009702
.009638
.009638
.00957*
.00957*
.008*86
.007526
.007520
.007520
.0062*0
.006176
.00*256
.002336
.002336
.000*16
.000*16
.000000
.000000
.005107
.005107
.0050*3
.005027
.00*982
.00*982
.00*918
.00*918
.00*502
.00*118
.00*112
.00*112
.003152
.00310*
.0021**
.00118*
.00118*
.00022*
.00022*
.000000
.000000
.001985
.001965
.001969
. 001963
.001937
.001937
.001908
.001908
.001710
.001518
.001517
.001517
.001133
.001107
.000*67
.000339
.000339
.000051
.000051
.000000
.000000
.0002*1
.0002*1
.0002*1
.0002*1
.0002*0
.0002*0
.000231
.000231
.000186
.000186
.000186
.000186
.000186
.000186
.000058
.000058
.000058
.000019
.000019
.000000
.000000
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TABLE 18
ANNUAL PROBABILITY THAT n OR MORE PLANES ARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Gate
Exposure E (fs/m )
10'
Number of
Planes n
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.033709
.033709
.03370°
.033b*5
.03.1b29
.03162°
.0315^3
.031533
.031373
.02b8Q3
.025600
.0230*0
.0230*0
.0230*0
.020800
.020800
.01856C
.016960
.012*80
.0118*0
.00*800
.0229Q5
.0229Q5
.022O Q5
.022950
.021oOo
.021bOt>
.0215^2
.0215^2
.021^1^
.01853U
.017o%
.01577b
.01577b
.015776
.013856
.01383'b
.01237b
.Ollolb
.008736
.008320
.002880
.011779
.011779
.Q1177a
.0117u3
.01107H
.01107b
.01101^
.01101^
.010950
.008°o6
.008b^0
.007360
,0073bO
.0073bO
.006^00
. O O b ^ O O
.003760
.0053UU
.00^00*4
.0038*0
. 0-009bO
.003720
.005720
.005720
.005713
.0033ob
.0053u8
.003339
.003330
.005300
.OO^bB
.00^^71
.003731
.003731
.003731
.003091
.003091
.002931
.002835
.002515
,002^b"
.0005^
.001207
.001207
.001207
.001207
.GOlC^u
.0010"o
.0010°7
.001037
.00102U
.000°28
.000Q22
.000730
.000730
.000730
.OOCbC)2
.000602
.000338
.000*99
.000371
.000352
.000000
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TABLE 19
ANNUAL PROBABILITY THAT n OR MORE PLANES ARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Maintenance
Number of
Planes n
Exposure E (fs/m3)
10= 10C 10'
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
.03830"
.035424
.035328
.031168
.026048
• .015168
.015168
.009088
.007488
.007488
.007^88
.007488
.005568
.005440
.005440
.OOlfaOO
..001600
.000000
.000000
.000000
,000000
.021760
,019b"8
.019584
.017664
.014784
.009024
.009024
.005184
.004224
.00"224
.004224
.00"22"
,0029^u
.002880
.002880
.000960
.000960
.000000
.000000
..000000
.000000
.011888
.010608
.0105^4
.009584
.00796"
.005*24
.005424
.002864
.002512
.002512
.002512
.002512
.001552
.001504
.001504
.0005""
.000544
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.003850
.003626
.003610
.003130
.002 "90
.002170
.002170
.000890
.000730
.000730
.000730
.000730
.000346
.000320
.000320
.000192
.000192
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000128
.000128
.000128
.000032
.000032
.000032
.000032
.000032
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
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TABLE 20
ANNUAL PROBABILITY THAT n OR MORE PLANES ARE EXPOSED
TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Qveral1
Exposure (fs/m )
Number of
Planes n
2
4
7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
19
20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
10°
.071o80
.068800
.06870"
.Oo"5""
.03750"
.0"bb24
.Q"b528
,0"C""8
,0388"8
.03"3o8
.033088
.030328.
.028608
.028"80
.0262"0
.022"00
.0201oO
.016900
.012480
.0118"0
.IKH1800
10
.0""832
.0"2720
,0"2b5o
.0"0"lo
.Q3 0 25b
.030^0
.O^O"^
.02o592
.025o32
.022752
.021Q20
.020000
.018720
. O l H b S b
.Olu73b
,01"6lb
.013536
.Oll.blb
.008736
.008320
.002880
10°
.023536
.02225b
.0221Q2
.0212^2
.018992
.Olb"°2-
.Olb3orf
.01Q808
.0133Q2
.011"72
.011152
.00° 8 72
.008912
.008864
.007904
.0069""
.00630"
.0053""
.00"C6"
.0038"0
.000°bO
10°
.00Q638
.009".?"
.009"18
.008^38
.007Q78
.G07b58
.007b2Q
.0063U.Q
.006157
.0051^7
.005101
.00""bl
.00"077
.00"031
.003"11
.003283
.003123
.002835
.002513
.002464
.0005""
10X
.001 3 3u
.00133"
.0013°"
.00123H
.OQ107«
.001078
.001 Cb«
,C010o9
.00102"
.000Q2«
.000Q22
.000730
.0007^0
.000730
.000602
.OOCo02
.0005g8
,000"OC|
.000371
.000352
.000000
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TABLE 21
AVERAGE FLEET MIX FOR AIRCRAFT EXPOSED IN ACCIDENTS
Maintenance Day
Maintenance Night
Gate Day
Gate Night
Maintenance Overall
Gate Overall
Day Overall
Night Overall
Overal1
% Small
79.2
70.5
79.2
75.2
75.5
78.7
79.2
72.9
78.0
% Medium
2.1
8.2
5.5
6.6
4.7
5.7.
5.0
7.4
5.4
% Large
18.7
21.3
15.3
18.2
19.8
15.6
15.8
19.7
16.6
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TABLE 22
EXPECTED NUMBER OF PLANES EXPOSED TO A
A GIVEN EXPOSURE ANNUALLY
Case
Total
Day
Night
Gate
Maintenance
Gate-Day
Gate-Night
Maintenance-Day
Maintenance-Night
3.2 x 103 3.2 x 104 3.2 x 105 3.2 x 106 3.2 x 107
.58387
.44512
.13875
.36774
.21613
,.32006
.04767
.12506
.09107
.53673
.42688
.10985
.41156
.12517
.35386
.05771
.07302
.05214
.28974
.21478
.07495
.18680
. 102 9 3
.15843
.02837
.05635
.04658
.21301
.17451
.03849
. .16408
.04892
.14482
.01927
.02970
.01923
.03884
.03310
.00574
.03772
.00112
.03243
.00530
.00067
.00045
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TABLE 2
COMPUTATION OF THE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF A CITY
Atlanta
Boston
Chicago
Kennedy
LaGuardia
Miami
Philadelphia
St. Louis
Washington
Estimated
1993 Op
433,434
171,897
599,339
289,275
213,724
249,330
138,520
165,764
189,295
Weather
Factor
1.09
1.06
1.04
1.05
1.05
.65
1.04
.99
.87
% CF
.54
.63
.72
.81
.61
.78
.60
.50
.64
Probability
.159
.072
.280
.154
.085
.079
.054
. 051
.066
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TABLE 3
PROBABILITY CONDITIONAL ON AN ACCIDENT THAT n OR MORE
PLANES ARE EXPOSED TO AN EXPOSURE OF E OR LARGER
Case: Aggregate Gate Day
Exposure E (fs/m )
2
4
. 7
10
11
12
13
14
16
18
Number of 19
Planes n 20
21
24
25
28
31
37
38
54
55
103
.00*500
.008500
.006500
.008500
.007900
.007000
.007900
.007900
.007QOO
.007000
. O O b b G G
.005800
.005800
.003800
.OC5800
.003^00
.005100
.005100
.003700
.003700
.001500
104
,Q057oO
. O O S V o C
.. 005700
.G057oO
.005°bO
.C053uO
.0053uO
.0053bO
.0053oO
, C O U 7 b Q .
.00^300
,00^°OC
.C039CC
.003900
.003QOO
.003900
.003500
.003300
.G02bOO
.002oOO
.OCOKVO
TO5
.00*000
.003000
.003000
.003000
.002800
.002800
.002800
.002800
.002800
.002300
.002200
.001800
.001800
.001800
.OClbOO
.001800
.OOloOO
.OOloOO
.001 200
.001200
.000300
106
.ogi^so
.001^50
.001^50
.001^50
.001350
,001°50
.001350
.001°50
.001350
.001130
.001120
.000920
.000U20
,000U20
.000920
.000920
.000870
.000870
.000770
.000770
.000170
107
.000312
.•Q00312.
.OCO':112
.000^12
.000262
.0002o2
.0002o2
.0002o2
,OC02b2
.000232
,000??0
.000170
.000170
.000170
.000170
.000170
.000150
.000130
.000110
.000110
".oooooc
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